In a session held by AMAN on effective accountability of presidential institutions,
Without elections to make it operational, accountability will remain inefficient
Ramallah – The Coalition for Accountability and Integrity (AMAN) held a session to discuss a draft report on The Reality of the Effectiveness of Accountability of Institutions Affiliated with the Palestinian President. The event brought together representatives of the State Audit and Administrative Control Bureau (SAACB), General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers (GS), institutions reporting to the President, civil society organisations, and media outlets.
In his opening statement, Mr. Issam Haj Hussein, AMAN Executive Director, explained the purpose of the report, stating that it did not provide an institutional performance assessment, but examined the mechanisms, tools, and effectiveness of the accountability of officials in charge of public institutions that reported to the President’s Office. The end goal was to submit practical recommendations with a view to operationalising formal tools to hold these officials’ functions to account.
Palestinian legislature realises the importance of separation of powers and functions
Haj Hussein added that the “Palestinian legislature recognises the importance of a balanced separation of powers and functions within each authority, including tasks of the President and Council of Ministers.” Accountability is not limited to annual reports submitted by relevant institutions to the President. Rather, these reports need to be effectively followed up. Institutional managers will be held to account if and when irregularities are reported. Solutions will be devised with the aim of influencing change for the better. Haj Hussein stressed the importance of access to the SAACB follow-up reports on compliance with the implementation of relevant recommendations, particularly given the lack of real accountability in the absence of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC).
Thirty nine public institutions and bodies report to the President
Ala’ al-Lahlouh, a researcher, made a presentation on the AMAN report findings and recommendations. A total of 39 public institutions and bodies have been affiliated with the President in different circumstances and contexts. These are as diverse as governmental institutions and bodies of the Palestinian Authority (PA), entities of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), non-profit civil society organisations, and private shareholding companies. While some were incorporated by presidential decrees or decisions, others were established by or affiliated with the President in his capacity as the Chairman of the PLO Executive Committee. Despite the fact that their budget line items are allocated by the PA Public Treasury, the majority of staff members of these institutions are civil servants under the Civil Service Law.
In his presentation, Lahlouh defined accountability as the duty of officials responsible for discharging public service to submit periodic reports on the functioning of their institutions. Reports will make clear and explain decision- and policy-making processes, readiness to assume responsibilities for the decisions made, and commitment to submit progress reports on respective institutions.
Mechanism for the accountability of presidential institutions is unclear
The AMAN report accounts for the disparity between institutions reporting to the Council of Ministers. Responsibility for supervision and monitoring the functions of these institutions lies either with the Council of Ministers or with relevant ministers. Reports prepared by lead officials are submitted to the Prime Minister, who deliberates them with members of the Council of Ministers. On the other hand, uncertainty continues to prevail over effective accountability of the managers of institutions affiliated with the President, including in terms of supervision, guidance, review of operations, and reports. As the PLC is out of session, the effectiveness of accountability, if any, is also ambiguous.
Lack of clear criteria to determine institutional affiliations either to the government or to the President’s Office
Lahlouh stated that a particular criterion was lacking to determine if institutions are subordinated to the government, President’s Office, or PLO. The large number of institutions affiliated with the President’s Office is unjustified. Many institutional functions overlap with those of other line ministries or government agencies. As they do not deliver tangible public services, presidential institutions can be integrated with government bodies or abolished altogether.
Executive powers of the PA President are set by the Basic Law. By contrast, executive and administrative powers are also within the competence of the Council of Ministers. According to Articles 68 and 69 of the Basic Law, unless provided otherwise, institutions will report to the Council of Ministers or the most relevant ministry.
Failure to make reports publicly available
The AMAN report shows that 13 of all 39 institutions reporting to the President do not have websites to post relevant information. Only five institutions publish annual reports on their websites. There is no public information as to whether other presidential institutions actually prepare annual reports. Different oversight reports indicate that only eight out of 39 presidential bodies have complaint units in place, raising questions about the efficiency of accountability of the performance of these institutions by the President’s Office.
In addition, a specialised administrative agency is not in place to assist the President in following up on presidential institutions both at home and abroad. The President only suffices with the functions of other oversight bodies, namely, the SAACB, Independent Commission for Human Rights (ICHR), Palestine Monetary Authority (PMA), and Palestinian Anti-Corruption Commission.
According to the report, when he receives reports, the President often responds by thanking presidential bodies and institutions for the efforts they make. In the event of omission, procedures for holding to account officials in charge of these institutions continue to be unclear.
Tayyem: SAACB, PMA, and ICHR reports brief the President about the current context of freedoms as well as financial and economic performance
Advisor Iyad Tayyem, SAACB Chairman, asserted that the responsibility centres audited by the SAACB outnumber its personnel, who are no more than 140 staff members. Of these, only 100 are auditors. Tayyem highlighted that the SAACB role is limited to submitting recommendations with a view to developing institutional functions.
According to Tayyem, some public institutions, including the Civil Affairs Authority, have been affiliated with the President for political purposes. All state institutions operate under the Israeli occupation, which obstructs functions and limits powers on the ground. Tayyem stressed that presidential institutions were not immune to the SAACB auditing. Officials have no immunities either, except those provided by law, such as judges and members of the diplomatic corps.
Rather than highlighting activities, the SAACB reports provide a characterisation of the current context of financial performance within the State. Based on this diagnosis, the SAACB submits recommendations with a view to enhancing the situation on the ground. ICHR reports characterise the reality of rights and freedoms as well as lay out needed measures to take remedial action on abuses. PMA reports describe the situation of the economy and provide tailored recommendations to develop the national economy. In substance, these reports provide a message to the President on the challenges facing the State in the said areas. Given the absence of the PLC, these reports show what needs to be done to follow up on and implement stated recommendations on the basis of the President’s powers and functions.
Tayyem commended a key recommendation of the AMAN report, namely, the importance of examining the status of each presidential institution. In particular, if ministerial bodies provide corresponding or similar functions, presidential institutions can be abolished, retained, or integrated.
Jaffal: The President’s Office assists the President in implementing his powers
Jaffal Jaffal, SAACB Director General, stressed the need to draw a distinction between the concept of accountability, functions of the President’s Office, and powers of the President. According to Jaffal, the President’s Office assists the President in implementing his powers. It is not tasked with exercising control over institutions reporting to the President. Oversight bodies, including the SAACB and PMA, are agencies used by the President to audit all institutions directly affiliated with the President.
Dharaghmeh: The GS works towards developing indicators that link performance to quality
Ms. Shadia Dharaghmeh emphasised that, many years ago, the GS began to examine the status of non-ministerial government bodies and investigate the possibility of integration or abolition in the light of public interest. Additionally, the GS has worked towards developing and linking performance indicators to quality units with a view to validating operational outcomes of these institutions in the medium and long runs. Dharaghmeh also highlighted the importance of practical and direct recommendations to contribute to the GS effort.
Without elections to make it operational, accountability will remain inefficient
According to the main finding of the AMAN report, an inactive PLC has adversely impacted functions of oversight bodies, such as the SAACB, as well as performance of the government. Even if it is capable of detecting infractions, the SAACB lacks remedial or penal powers. According to applicable laws, the SAACB prepares and submits recommendations to the PLC. The latter follows up on these recommendations through the means provided by law.
The AMAN report recommends that general, presidential and legislative, elections be held to enable citizens to exercise their right to choose their representatives at political institutions. The political system needs to be rebalanced by a PLC that acquires popular legitimacy so as to deliver on respective functions, including oversight and accountability. Relevant provisions of the Basic Law on the establishment of public institutions and bodies will be complied with. Pursuant to Article 69 of the Basic Law, this task will remain the prerogative of the Council of Ministers.
The report further highlights previous recommendations of AMAN with regard to slimmer state institutions. A feasibility study will investigate the large number of public institutions, considering potential integration, abolition, or regularisation. In reference of relevant Palestinian legislation, clear criteria will be in place to help determine the reporting relationship of each public institution. The provisions of this body of laws will be maintained in practice.
