



# Survey on the Public Perception of Corruption and Anti-Corruption Landscape in Occupied Palestinian Territory 2024



**2024**



# **Survey on the Public Perception of Corruption and Anti-Corruption Landscape in Occupied Palestinian Territory 2024**

**September  
2024**



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## Executive Summary

The Coalition for Integrity and Accountability (AMAN) carried out a poll of Palestinian public opinion in both the West Bank (including Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip, on (The Reality of Corruption and Anti-Corruption Efforts in Palestine in 2024), during the period between 1 and 12 September 2024. The poll aims to monitor any changes in citizens' impressions and awareness about the reality of corruption and anti-corruption efforts.

The survey discussed several key issues, which will be listed in order hereunder:

### **First: The primary issue warranting prioritized resolution is:**

Occupation, economic issues, rampant corruption, continued division, and the weak rule of law are the five priorities to be addressed (38%, 21%, 18%, 14%, 6% respectively).

The occupation and its policies are seen as the primary challenge that must be prioritized. According to citizens, 38% identify the policies and practices of the Israeli occupation as the most pressing issue, followed by the escalating economic crises at 21%. When adding the rest of the issues such as the spread of corruption 18%, the ongoing division 14%, and the weakness of the rule of law 6%, the combined percentage reaches 59%.

It is noticed that this issue ranked first with the largest percentage for the year 2024 due to the problem of occupation policies and the subsequent general situation that occurred, represented by the continuation of the war on Gaza Strip from October 7, 2023, until the current year 2024. The West Bank experienced increased restrictions due to the ongoing war in the Strip, The main problem that should be a priority to solve this year was the occupation (38%). While the percentage in the last year 2023, was 22%.

It is clear that the percentage of this problem has increased significantly between the two years, due to the general situation that the West Bank.

### **Second: Citizens' assessment of the extent of corruption and its spread in Palestine:**

#### **Pessimism in citizens' impressions about the level of spread of corruption**

- The percentage of citizens who believe that the level of spread of corruption in state institutions has increased to (70%) in 2024. This percentage is higher among the 30-40 age group, at 75%, compared to 71% among those over 40, who also believe that corruption is widespread.
- The percentage of citizens who are pessimistic about their expectations of the reality and efforts to combat corruption decreased one point from the expected rate of last year 2023 (57%), as 56% of citizens this year said that they believe that corruption will increase in the coming year.
- Description of the perpetrators of corruption (high-ranks, ordinary ranks): The respondents still believe that 82% of the senior employees (high-ranking positions) are perpetrators of corruption, with (90% in the West Bank and 70% in Gaza). Whereas, the predominant characteristic of perpetrators of corruption among those occupying ordinary positions (ordinary ranks) reached 18%, with (10% in the West Bank and 30% in Gaza).

### **Official institutions are the most vulnerable to the spread of corruption**

(25%) of the respondents believe that the presidency office is the institution most exposed to the spread of corruption, followed by the security services (20%), then the executive authority, which includes: "The Council of Ministers, ministries and public entities" at (20%), and the judiciary at (14%).

### **Ministries most vulnerable to the spread of corruption**

(18%) of the respondents believe that the Ministry of Social Development is the most exposed to the spread of corruption, followed by the Ministry of Finance (16%), the Ministry of Health (15%), security institutions (9%), and the Ministry of Education (7%).

### **The sectors most exposed to corruption**

In the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 49% of surveyed respondents believe that the sectors most susceptible to corruption are official government institutions, particularly those in senior positions working in executive public sector entities such as ministries and security agencies. Civil society organizations and charitable associations follow at 21%, with the private sector at 15%, and local authorities at 14%.

- The three most vulnerable entities to the spread of corruption are the executive authority (the Council of Ministers, ministries, and public entities) at 25%, the security services at 22%, and the judicial authority (courts and the Public Prosecution) at 18%.
- According to citizens, the ministries that provide services directly (social development, finance, health and security institutions) are the most vulnerable to the spread of corruption.

It is clear that the impression among respondents regarding the spread of corruption in civil work has risen sharply in the Gaza Strip, due to its role in distributing aid. Also, the role of most government institutions in Gaza has declined due to the destruction caused by Israel to their buildings, and the killing or flight of their officials abroad.

### **Third: Corruption Crimes in Palestine**

Nepotism, favoritism, embezzlement of public funds, abuse of power, bribery, and breach of trust are the most prevalent forms of corruption (18%, 16%, 14%, 13%, 12% respectively). The respondents who practiced nepotism explained that this was due to:

- Their desire to shorten the time of the transaction rather than following bureaucratic procedures 20%.
- Fear that someone else who is not worthy of the service will obtain it due to corruption 19%.
- Fear of not being able to obtain the service due to limited opportunities 18%.
- Lack of trust in the integrity of service providers 18%.
- A form of assistance that acquaintances must provide you with 14%.
- The culture of the Palestinian citizens who see nothing wrong with resorting to nepotism 12%.

Citizens believe that crimes related to food and drug corruption have remained at the same level in 2024. The percentage of citizens who believe that crimes related to food and drug corruption are the same as last year (2023) at 80%, due to:

- The perpetrators of these crimes are not held accountable or prosecuted 29%.
- Using nepotism, patronage, and favoritism to turn a blind eye to these crimes 26%.
- Existing legislation does not provide deterrent punishment 20%.
- The multiplicity and overlapping role of official parties entrusted with following up on food and drug issues 14%.
- Weak awareness of citizens about these crimes 12%.

Citizens believe that weak commitment to the rule of law, lack of seriousness in holding senior corrupt officials accountable, the practices of the Israeli occupation and its role in encouraging corruption, and failure to activate the role of the Legislative Council and audit bureaus create an environment that encourages corruption. Citizens also believe that corruption spreads more in the areas of appointments and promotions to senior positions, as well as health services, distribution of humanitarian and social in kind and in cash aid, and granting official licenses, permits and authorizations.

#### **Fourth: Reasons that contributed to the spread of corruption in Palestine are still diverse**

Regarding the reasons that contributed to the spread of corruption in Palestine, the survey pointed out that:

- 21% of respondents believed that the most important reason is due to the non-compliance with the principle of the rule of law.
- 17% believed that the second most important reason is the lack of seriousness in holding the most corrupt people accountable.
- 13% of citizens believe that the immunity enjoyed by individuals, the practices of the Israeli occupation and its role in creating an environment that encourages corruption, are among the reasons that contributed to the spread of corruption in Palestine.
- 10% of citizens believe that the reason for the spread of corruption in Palestine is due to the failure to activate the role of the Legislative Council and oversight institutions, and the political division between the West Bank and Gaza.
- 9% of citizens believe that the reason for the spread of corruption in Palestine is due to the failure to activate the role of the Legislative Council and oversight institutions, and the political division between the West Bank and Gaza.
- 8% of citizens believe that the reason for the spread of corruption in Palestine is the lack of awareness among citizens about the forms of corruption.

#### **Fifth: Corruption in the provision of public services**

According to 2024 poll, the public areas that are most vulnerable to the spread of corruption are:

- Promotions and appointments domain comes in the first place for the widespread of corruption with a percentage reaching 22%.
- The health services domain reached 20%.
- The provision of humanitarian and social assistance in kind and cash domain reached 18%.
- The granting of permits, licenses and official authorizations domain reached 13%.
- Other services provision domain including university education, customs and tax collection, water services, electricity services, communications services, did not exceed 10% for each.

As for the ease of obtaining information from public records, the results for 2024 showed that 66% of citizens indicated that this is not done easily, and 23% indicated that obtaining information from public records is done easily.

#### **Sixth: Nepotism is still widely practiced in obtaining services:**

- The results for 2024 showed that 40% of citizens go to public institutions to obtain services.
- 47% of citizens who go to public institutions to request services believe that they use nepotism to obtain services.
- Regarding nepotism in public sector appointments and promotions, 83% of citizens who responded to the 2024 poll believe it is prevalent, with this figure rising to 85% for senior government positions.



### **Seventh: Offering bribes and gifts:**

The rate of bribery crime decreased in 2024 compared to last year, whereas the crime of nepotism and favoritism increased.

The percentage of those who said that they or a relative had paid bribes or given gifts to a public employee reached 17%. Compared to the results of last year 2023, it is clear that there is a decrease in this percentage by 12 points. Several factors have encouraged some workers in the service sector to ask for bribes, these include the relatively low income of junior employees, the mounting pressure arising from increasing personal needs, exploitation of citizens' reliance on services, and a lack of holding those engaged in corrupt practices accountable.

26% of citizens considered nepotism and favoritism to be the most widespread corruption crime At the rate of 18%, while 16% of citizens considered bribery to be the most widespread corruption crime. According to the opinions of a number of respondents, health services, granting permits and authorization services, and education services are more vulnerable to the spread of bribery, with the percentages being (28%, 27%, 23%) respectively.

The percentage of those who offered a bribe or gift increased in the current year 2024, compared to last year 2023. This increase was concentrated in the West Bank, rising from 60% to 70%, while this percentage decreased in the Gaza Strip by about 11 points (40%-29%). The underlying reason for this is the state of war that the Strip has been suffering from for an entire year since October last year, until today.

### **Eighth: The role of the media in combating corruption**

Citizens still believe that the role of the media in combating corruption is ineffective

48% of citizens believe that the role of the Palestinian media is weak or moderately effective in exposing corruption cases. On the other hand, 50% of citizens believe that digital media is the most effective media outlet in shedding light and exposing corruption cases that occurred in 2024.

### **Ninth: Corruption in the Judiciary**

Despite the low percentage of surveyed citizens who believe there is corruption in the judicial system, the percentage is still high, especially since citizens do not distinguish between the role of the public prosecution and the work of judges (courts). The results of the poll show that 68% of respondents believe that there is corruption in the judiciary, with a clear increase in the West Bank compared to the Gaza Strip (78% in the West Bank and 53% in the Gaza Strip).

As for the autonomy of entities responsible for combating corruption in the West Bank, including the Anti-Corruption Commission and the Financial and Administrative Control Bureau...etc.), the survey indicated that 72% of respondents in the West Bank believe that these entities do not play their role effectively and independently.

A high percentage of respondents in the Gaza Strip doubt the independence of the authorities charged with combating corruption in the Strip (the Anti-Corruption and Money Crimes Prosecution, the Administrative and Financial Oversight Bureau), as (64%) of them believe that these authorities do not practice their work independently.



The executive authorities are the most interfering in the work of the bodies charged with combating corruption. In the West Bank, the survey illustrated that (29%) believe that the Prime Minister and ministers are the most interfering, followed by the President's Office (27%) and then the security services (22%).

In the Gaza Strip, the survey revealed that 29% of those who believe the authorities responsible for combating corruption lack independence identified the security services as the most interfering in the work of these bodies. This was followed by party leaders and the Attorney General, each at 25%, and members of the Legislative Council at 18%.

The results show that there is a consensus among citizens in the West Bank and Gaza Strip on the low level of independence and effectiveness of the bodies that follow up on corruption cases (the Anti-Corruption Commission, the State Audit Administrative Control Bureau in the West Bank, and the Financial and Administrative Control Bureau in the Gaza Strip). They also believe that there are interferences and influences facing these institution' exercise of their role by various parties and entities, such as the presidential office, the security services, faction leaders in the West Bank, the security services, and members of the Change and Reform Bloc affiliated with Hamas in the Gaza Strip, which may lead to a weakening of citizens' confidence in the West Bank and Gaza in authorities responsible for following up on corruption cases.

#### **Tenth: Role of civil society organizations in combating corruption is inadequate:**

Regarding the role of civil society organizations in combating corruption, the survey results indicate that 45% believe that the role of civil society organizations in combating corruption is effective or moderately effective, and that 51% believe that their role is ineffective.

#### **Eleventh: Citizens are still reluctant to report corruption**

According to the poll, 33% believe that citizens report cases of corruption they observe, while 56% do not believe this.

- Reporting corruption as witnesses: 53% would report as witnesses if they were exposed to corruption, and 40% would not.
- Reporting corruption as victims: 60% would report an act of corruption if they were victims, and 34% would not.
- As for citizens' opinions on reporting corruption, the survey indicated that 33% of citizens believe that reporting corruption is a citizen's right and freedom, while 56% believe that reporting is a duty under the law, and 12% consider it an unfavorable practice in society.

#### **Twelfth: The most important reasons why citizens do not report corruption**

Despite the adoption of the regulation that protects whistleblowers, and the increase in the percentage of those who say that reporting corruption is a duty under the law compared to previous years, the majority of citizens still believe that citizens are reluctant to report corruption, due to:

- Lack of adequate protection for whistleblowers and witnesses 19%.
- Lack of sufficient awareness of the meaning and forms of corruption 17%.
- Lack of conviction in the feasibility of whistleblowing because no action will be taken against the corrupt 13%.
- Fear of revenge 12%.
- Not knowing which entity is authorized to receive corruption complaints 11%.
- Reasons for not being able to prove corruption 8%.

### **Thirteenth: Efforts exerted in combating corruption**

A large majority of citizens consider that efforts exerted to combat corruption are insufficient. A large majority of citizens (87%) consider that efforts exerted to combat corruption are insufficient. Citizens also believe that the most important reason for the insufficient efforts exerted to combat corruption is due to:

1. The penalties applied to perpetrators of corruption crimes are not deterrent 29%.
2. Weak transparency in the management of state institutions 27%.
3. Weak political will to hold the corrupt accountable and bring them to justice 23%.
4. Lack of role models who stand as an example of officials' commitment to the values of integrity and preservation of resources and public interest 20%.

### **Fourteenth: Change in the level of corruption: Citizens remain pessimistic about the level of corruption and the fight against it**

As for the change in the level of corruption for the year 2024, 66% of the respondents believe that corruption has increased.

As for the future expectations of citizens regarding the level of the spread of corruption for the coming year, 56% of the respondents believe that it will increase next year in 2025.

## Introduction

The Coalition for Accountability and Integrity (AMAN) produces an annual report on the corruption landscape, leveraging a spectrum of data, indicators, and inputs—including the findings of the Survey on The Public Perception of Corruption and Anti-Corruption Landscape in Occupied Palestinian Territory 2024.

To prepare the 2024 annual report, AMAN engaged the Thabat Center for Survey Research and Opinion Polls to conduct a public opinion survey on the corruption and anti-corruption landscape across the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt). The center conducted the survey and fieldwork in the West Bank (including Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip between September 1 and 12, 2024.

The Survey on The Public Perception of Corruption and Anti-Corruption Landscape in Occupied Palestinian Territory 2024 aims to examine shifts and changes in public perceptions and awareness of corruption, assess public willingness to engage in anti-corruption efforts, and compare the results with those of past years.

The survey sampled 1,400 individuals aged 18 and above, with 800 respondents from the West Bank (including Jerusalem) and 600 from the Gaza Strip. The data, collected through face-to-face interviews in respondents' homes, carry a margin of error of  $\pm 3$  percent.

## Methodology

### 1. Questionnaire Design

The questionnaire was developed at the outset of the survey process in collaboration with AMAN. It includes all the questions necessary to meet its *raison d'être*.

### 2. Sample Selection

The oPt is divided into strata of towns, cities, villages, and refugee camps across sixteen governorates. It is also subdivided into enumeration areas or clusters—each housing 80 to 160 households. The 2017 census provides granular household data and maps marking every household within each cluster. In total, there are 7,294 clusters across oPt.

A random sample of eighty clusters was selected using the probability proportional to size method. Clusters were organized by size (i.e., number of households) to ensure representation across strata and clusters of various sizes. In Gaza, given the war conditions, thirty clusters were selected using a methodology tailored to such circumstances, with twenty interviews conducted in each cluster, as detailed in the following sections.

#### - West Bank

In the West Bank, fifty enumeration areas were chosen, with sixteen households systematically selected from each cluster. The total sample size was 1,400 households. Sampling was conducted in homes, tents, or shelters. Using the Kish grid, field researchers selected one adult (18 years or older) from among the household members for interviewing. All interviews were conducted face-to-face, with data collected via tablets or paper questionnaires.

## **- Gaza Strip**

Thirty clusters were selected from the populations of Deir al-Balah, Khan Younis, and the communities displaced from northern Gaza, Rafah, and Gaza City and forcibly relocated to these areas under the dictates of the Israeli army. These clusters were categorized either as enumeration areas, according to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) (notably in Khan Younis and parts of Deir al-Balah), or as displaced camps and shelters in government or Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) schools or facilities. In some cases, the clusters consisted of tented communities scattered across areas like Deir al-Balah and Mawasi Khan Younis according to the following methodology:

1. In shelters, a systematic random sample was drawn from lists of residents at these locations, which covered all shelters in Deir al-Balah and Mawasi Khan Younis. These areas constituted ten clusters, including displacement camps and shelters.
2. In the enumeration areas designated by the PCBS, eight areas were included.
3. Additional enumeration areas were identified, including tented communities in Khan Younis and Deir al-Balah. These areas were mapped to determine their locations and divided into blocks, with twelve blocks being selected for interviews.

In each shelter, enumeration area, or tented community, twenty individuals were systematically, albeit randomly, selected for interviews.

## **3. Data Collection**

Experienced field researchers conducted face-to-face interviews. These researchers participated in specialized training sessions—some conducted in person and others remotely over the phone—to review the survey's objectives, methodology, and questionnaire.

Data were collected using tablets equipped with a custom-built application for the questionnaire. This method adhered to strict quality control standards, enabling real-time monitoring and field supervision.

## **4. Questionnaire Pilot Testing**

A pilot test of the questionnaire was conducted with a sample of thirty-six individuals: sixteen in the West Bank and twenty in the Gaza Strip. The test aimed to validate the questionnaire and ensure participants could understand the questions and response options. This process allowed for necessary adjustments before finalizing the questionnaire. It was also reviewed for internal consistency and reliability using Cronbach's alpha coefficient.

## **5. Field Researcher Training**

For the survey purposes, the Thabat Center (from now on, “the center”), in collaboration with AMAN, delivered targeted training workshops for field researchers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. These sessions provided comprehensive instruction on the survey's methodology, sampling, questionnaire design, interview techniques, electronic questionnaire conduction, and tablet use.

## **6. Monitoring and Follow-Up**

The center deployed two levels of monitoring during the survey:

- 1) Field monitoring: Field coordinators and supervisors closely monitored the research team's activities, maintaining regular communication with researchers to ensure smooth operations, proper compliance with interview procedures, and prompt resolution of any issues. Further, the field research team submitted daily reports on their activities and any problems that emerged along the way.
- 2) Desk Monitoring: Desk monitoring includes the following tools:
  - a. Verification Calls: The center conducted random phone calls to survey participants to validate reported progress and interviews.
  - b. Desk Review: Completed questionnaires were desk reviewed to verify responses, ensure proper transitions among questions, and validate collected data. This process included monitoring the electronic questionnaires and tracking the movements of field researchers.
  - c. Questionnaire Application: A custom electronic questionnaire system was designed with built-in controls and parameters to identify issues in real time, ensuring they were addressed promptly during fieldwork. The system also allowed for live monitoring of researchers' activities and confirmed their presence in the field.

## **7. Data Analysis**

The data were analyzed via the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) software upon comprehensive review and processing.

# Survey on The Public Perception of Corruption and Anti-Corruption in Occupied Palestinian Territory 2024: Results


## 1. Priority Issues for Resolution

The survey explored the most pressing challenges facing Palestinian society and should be prioritized for resolution. Israeli occupation's policies and practices were identified as the foremost challenge, cited by 38 percent of respondents (38 percent in the West Bank and 37 percent in the Gaza Strip). Economic crises followed as the second-highest priority, cited by 21 percent of respondents (25 percent in the West Bank and 14 percent in the Gaza Strip). Widespread corruption emerged third, as 18 percent of respondents identified it as a priority challenge (23 percent in the West Bank and 10 percent in the Gaza Strip). The enduring persistent political division was identified by 14 percent of respondents, with a clear disparity between the West Bank (7 percent) and Gaza Strip (26 percent). While 6 percent of respondents considered the weak rule of law as the primary issue, 3 percent pointed to fragile infrastructure (1 percent in the West Bank compared to 6 percent in the Gaza Strip). For more details, refer to the table and figure below.

Table 1: Priority issues for action and resolution

	oPt	West Bank	Gaza Strip
Israeli occupation's policies and practices	37.8%	38.2%	37.2%
Escalating economic crises	20.6%	25.2%	13.8%
Widespread corruption	18.0%	23.4%	9.9%
Persistent political division	14.4%	6.7%	25.8%
Weak rule of law (including protection of rights and public freedoms)	6.2%	5.5%	7.2%
Fragile infrastructure	3.0%	.9%	6.1%
	%100	%100	%100

Figure 1: Priority issues for action and resolution




A comparison of these findings with previous surveys shows that Israeli occupation's policies and malpractices are the overriding priority challenge, followed by the intensifying economic crises, widespread corruption, and enduring political division—critical challenges that Palestinian members of the public prioritize for resolution. For additional details, refer to the table and figure below.

Table 1(a): Priority issues for resolution (comparative data, 2016–24)

Issue	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
Escalating economic crises	29.1%	29.6%	24.7%	27.3%	26.1%	22.6%	27.5%	25.8%	20.6%
Widespread corruption	25.2%	26.5%	33.5%	26.4%	24.9%	27.6%	25.1%	21.4%	18.0%
Israeli occupation's policies and practices	19.7%	17.7%	16.7%	21.7%	20.6%	22.9%	20.7%	21.8%	37.8%
Persistent political division	15.6%	15.6%	16.3%	14.9%	13.8%	13.1%	10.5%	17.7%	14.4%
Weak rule of law	6.3%	5.6%	5.1%	6.8%	10.1%	10.3%	11.1%	10.7%	6.2%
Fragile infrastructure	4.1%	5.0%	3.7%	2.8%	4.5%	3.5%	5.1%	2.7%	3.0%
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Figure 1(a): Top three priority issues for resolution, 2016–24





**- Key issues prioritized for resolution according to selected variables.**

**- Escalating economic crises**

- Gender: Women are more likely to identify rising economic crises as the core issue, with 23 percent identifying it as such, compared to 18 percent of men.
- Region: Concern over economic crises is highest among residents of the southern West Bank (33 percent), followed by the central West Bank (24 percent), and lowest in the northern West Bank (20 percent).

**- Widespread corruption**

- Region: A greater proportion of respondents from the central West Bank (29 percent) consider corruption as the top-priority issue compared to those in the southern (24 percent) and northern (20 percent) West Bank.
- Gender: Male respondents prioritize corruption at a higher rate (20 percent) than females (16 percent).
- Employment status: The percentage is higher among unemployed respondents (23 percent) compared to employed respondents (17 percent).

**- Israeli occupation's policies and practices**

- Region: Concern over Israeli occupation policies is highest among residents of the northern West Bankers (44 percent), compared to those in the southern (38 percent) and central (30 percent) West Bank.
- Education: Respondents with lower levels of education are more likely to prioritize this issue (42 percent) compared to those with higher levels of education (37 percent).

## **2. Public Perceptions of Corruption Scale in Palestine**

This section explores the Palestinian public perception of the scale and spread of corruption in the Palestinian Authority (PA)'s institutions. It also identifies the entities and sectors most affected by corruption across government agencies, private enterprises, and civil society organizations.


### **2.1. Levels of corruption in Palestinian society**

A resounding 70 percent of respondents perceive corruption as pervasive in Palestinian society, while 23 percent consider it moderate. Only 5 percent describe it as minimal. For more details, consult the table and figure below.

Table 2.1: Public perceptions of corruption levels in Palestinian society

Level	oPt	West Bank	Gaza Strip
High	70%	77%	61%
Moderate	23%	19%	30%
Low	5%	2%	9%
No opinion/don't know	1%	2%	%
	100%	100%	100%

Figure 2.1: Corruption levels in Palestinian society




The patterns over the years show a growing public perception that corruption levels in Palestinian society are high. The figure increased to 70 percent in the current survey, up from 63 percent in the 2023 survey and 56 percent in 2022. For more details, refer to the table below:

Table 2.1(a): Corruption levels in Palestinian society (comparative data, 2016–24)

Issue	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
Escalating economic	60%	57%	64%	63%	58%	63%	56%	63%	70%
Widespread corruption	33%	36%	31%	29%	32%	30%	34%	30%	23%
Israeli occupation's policies	6%	7%	5%	7%	10%	6%	10%	6%	5%
Persistent political	--	--	--	1%	1%	1%	0%	1%	1%
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Figure 2.1(a): Corruption levels in Palestinian society, 2016–24



## - Description of corruption as high based on selected variables

- **Region:** The perception that corruption is high is most pronounced in the southern West Bank (86 percent) and central West Bank (80 percent), with a relatively lower percentage in the northern West Bank (68 percent).
- **Age Groups:** Older citizens are more likely to identify corruption as high, with 75 percent of those aged 30–40 and 71 percent of respondents over 40 holding this view, compared to 67 percent among those under 30.
- **Employment Sector:** Workers in the private sector demonstrate a higher perception of high corruption (76 percent), compared to 68 percent among public sector employees and just 33 percent among those in the nongovernmental organization (NGO) sector.
- **Income Level:** The perception of high corruption is higher among respondents earning above ILS 4,500 (82 percent) and those earning between ILS 3,500 and 4,500 (74 percent), compared to 69 percent among those earning less than ILS 2,500.

## 2.2. Corruption Perpetrators: Senior Officials vs. Ordinary Staff

The survey results reveal that senior officials are predominantly perceived as the primary actors behind corruption in oPt, as indicated by 82 percent of respondents (90 percent in the West Bank and 70 percent in the Gaza Strip). In contrast, 18 percent of respondents attributed corruption to ordinary staff (10 percent in the West Bank and 30 percent in the Gaza Strip). For further details, refer to the table below.

Table 2.2: Corruption perpetrators

Level	oPt	West Bank	Gaza Strip
Senior political officials (holders of upper-level positions)	82%	90%	70%
Ordinary staff (lower-level positions)	18%	10%	30%
	100%	100%	100%

Compared with AMAN's previous surveys, these figures demonstrate that most of the public perceives senior officials as the primary perpetrators of corruption. This sentiment has grown by 3 percent since the 2023 survey. Refer to the table below for more information.

Table 2.2(a): Corruption perpetrators (comparative data with AMAN's past surveys, 2016–24)

	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
Senior-level officials	78%	82%	79%	82%	82%	77%	73%	79%	82%
Ordinary-level staff	22%	18%	21%	18%	18%	20%	27%	21%	18%
No opinion/don't know	---	---	---	---	---	3%	---	---	---
Refused to answer	---	---	---	---	---	1%	---	---	---
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

### - Corruption perpetrators by selected variables

- Region: The perception that corruption is mainly committed by senior officials is highest among residents of the central West Bank (86 percent) and Northern West Bank (83 percent), compared to southern West Bank (76 percent) residents.
- Employment sector: The belief that senior officials are the main culprits is higher among those in the private sector (81 percent) compared to those employed in the government sector (77 percent).


## 2.3. Sectors Most Exposed to Corruption

According to 49 percent of respondents, government agencies are the most corruption-prone sector, followed by NGOs and charities (21 percent). Private public service providers are cited by 15 percent, and local councils and municipalities by 14 percent. For further details, refer to the table and figure below.

Table 2.3: Corruption by sector

Sector	oPt	West Bank	Gaza Strip
Government agencies	49%	64%	26%
Private sector (private public service providers)	15%	11%	21%
NGOs and charities	21%	11%	36%
Local government units (municipalities and local councils)	14%	13%	16%
	100%	100%	100%

Figure 2.3: Sector most prone to corruption



When compared with previous AMAN surveys, government agencies and local councils remain the sectors perceived as most exposed to corruption, collectively accounting for 63 percent in this survey—slightly below the 67 percent average of past years. More details are available in the table below.

Table 2.3(a): Exposure to corruption by sector (comparative data with AMAN's previous surveys, 2016–24)

	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
Government agencies and local government units	52%	59%	68%	74%	72%	68%	71%	69%	63%
NGOs and charities	26%	21%	20%	13%	14%	15%	15%	15%	15%
Private sector	22%	20%	12%	13%	14%	16%	14%	16%	21%
No opinion/don't know	---	---	---	---	---	1%	---	---	
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

#### - Perception of corruption prevalence in government agencies by selected variables

- Age group: Respondents over 30 years old are more likely to perceive government agencies as most exposed to corruption, at 51 percent, compared to 47 percent among respondents under 30 years old.
- Income level: Perceptions rise to 69 percent among respondents with a monthly household income above ILS 5,500, versus 42 percent among those earning less than ILS 1,500.

## 2.4. Government agencies most exposed to corruption


As part of the survey, respondents ranked the three government agencies or public institutions they perceive as most exposed to corruption from a predefined list. The executive authority—including the cabinet, ministries, and public institutions—tops the list, with 25 percent. This is followed by the Ministry of Interior (Mol) security agencies (22 percent), the judiciary (courts and public prosecution) at 18 percent, and the presidency at 16 percent. Local councils, including municipalities and village councils, were cited by 11 percent, while religious institutions—including sharia and ecclesiastical courts and endowments—accounted for 4 percent.

In the Gaza Strip, respondents were presented with an additional category: the legislature (Palestinian Legislative Council). Of these respondents, 4 percent identified it as the most corruption-prone public institution. For further information, refer to the table and figure below.

Table 2.4: Government agencies most exposed to corruption

	1st exposed	2nd most exposed	3rd most exposed	Average
Legislature (Gaza only)	3%	5%	3%	4%
Religious institutions (sharia and ecclesiastical courts, and endowments)	5%	3%	4%	4%
Local government units (municipalities and village councils)	12%	10%	10%	11%
Presidency	25%	12%	10%	16%
Judiciary (courts and public prosecution)	14%	18%	22%	18%
Mol security forces	20%	24%	21%	22%
Executive authority (cabinet, ministries, and public institutions)	20%	27%	29%	25%

Figure 2.4: Government agencies and public institutions most exposed to corruption



A comparison between the current survey and the 2023 findings reveals the following patterns regarding the public institutions perceived as most susceptible to corruption:

1. The executive authority (cabinet, ministries, and public agencies): Identified by 25 percent of respondents, reflecting a slight drop from 27 percent in 2023.
2. Security agencies: Cited by 22 percent, showing an upward curve from 19 percent in the previous year.
3. Judiciary (courts and prosecution offices): Maintains a consistent perception, with 18 percent of respondents aligning closely with 2023's 19 percent.
4. Local councils (municipalities and village councils): Responses remained stable, at 11 percent this year versus 12 percent in 2023.

For further details, refer to the table below.

Table 2.4(a): Government agencies and state institutions most exposed to corruption (average, 2022–2024)

	2022	2023	2024
<b>Executive authority (cabinet, ministries, and public institutions)</b>	24.1%	26.9%	25.4%
<b>Mol security agencies</b>	16.4%	18.5%	21.8%
<b>Local government units (municipalities and village councils)</b>	16.9%	11.9%	10.8%
<b>Judiciary (courts and public prosecution)</b>	14.6%	18.5%	17.9%
<b>Legislature (Gaza only)</b>	8.0%	6.2%	4.0%
<b>Presidency</b>	10.8%	12.4%	16.0%
<b>Religious institutions (sharia and ecclesiastical courts, and endowments)</b>	6.7%	5.4%	4.2%
	100%	100%	100%

## 2.5. Government ministries and agencies most exposed to corruption

Respondents were asked to rank the top three government ministries and agencies most exposed to corruption from a predefined list.

1. Ministry of Social Development (MoSD): Cited by 18 percent of respondents as the most exposed to corruption, ranking first.
2. Ministry of Finance (MoF): A close second, cited by 16 percent.
3. Ministry of Health (MoH): Ranked third, at 15 percent.
4. Mol Security agencies: Noted by 10 percent.


Other ministries and government agencies were each cited by 6 percent or less. For additional details, refer to the table and chart below.

Table 2.5: Ministries and government agencies most exposed to corruption

	1st exposed	2nd most exposed	3rd most exposed	Average
<b>MoSD</b>	16%	17%	20%	18%
<b>MoF</b>	19%	18%	12%	16%
<b>MoH</b>	9%	17%	19%	15%
<b>Mol security agencies</b>	15%	9%	5%	9%
<b>Ministry of Education (MoE)</b>	8%	6%	7%	7%
<b>Ministry of Transport and Communications (MoTC)</b>	4%	5%	9%	6%
<b>Ministry of Awqaf and Religious Affairs (MoARA)</b>	5%	6%	5%	5%
<b>Ministry of National Economy (MoNE)</b>	5%	4%	5%	5%
<b>Land Authority (PLA)</b>	4%	5%	4%	4%
<b>General Authority of Civil Affairs (GACA)</b>	5%	4%	4%	4%
<b>Authority of Crossings and Borders</b>	5%	2%	3%	3%
<b>Water Authority (PWA)</b>	3%	2%	4%	3%
<b>Land and Water Settlement Commission (LWSC)</b>	1%	2%	1%	2%
<b>Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research (MoHESR)</b>	1%	1%	1%	1%
<b>Energy Authority (PEA)</b>	1%	1%	1%	1%
<b>Ministry of Telecommunications and Information Technology (MoTIT)</b>	1%	1%	1%	1%



Figure 2.5: Government ministries/agencies most exposed to corruption



When comparing the 2024 findings to 2023, most figures remained consistent, with one notable exception: perceptions of corruption within the MoSD rose significantly, increasing from 14 percent in 2023 to 21 percent in this year's survey. Full details are presented in the table below.

Table 2.5(a): Government Ministries/agencies most exposed to corruption, 2022–24

	2022	2023	2024
MoSD	13.8%	21%	18%
MoH	17.6%	16%	15%
MoF	16.5%	15%	16%
Mol security agencies	8.8%	10%	9%
MoE	6.8%	6%	7%
MoTC	5.8%	6%	6%
MoNE	5.2%	4%	5%
GACA	3.7%	4%	4%
PEA	1.6%	3%	1%
MoARA	4.8%	3%	5%
PWA	2.6%	2%	3%
Authority of Crossings and Borders	3.7%	2%	3%
PLA	2.2%	2%	4%
LWSC	2.8%	2%	2%
MoTIT	2.7%	2%	1%
MoHESR	1.3%	1%	1%
	100%	100%	100%

### 3. Corruption Crimes in oPt

#### 3.1. Most prevalent corruption crimes

Exploring the most prevalent corruption crimes in oPt, the survey asked the respondents to identify the top three from a provided list. The results are as follows:


1. Wasta (abuse of connections), favoritism, and nepotism: Identified by 18 percent of respondents as the most prevalent crime.
2. Embezzlement of public funds: Came in second at 16 percent.
3. Abuse of power: Ranked third at 14 percent.
4. Bribery for public services: Cited by 13 percent of respondents.
5. Breach of trust: Indicated by 12 percent.
6. Other crimes: Each reported by less than 10 percent of respondents.

For further details, refer to the table and figure below.

Table 3.1: Most prevalent corruption crimes in oPt

	Most prevalent (%)	Second most prevalent (%)	Third most prevalent (%)	Average (%)
Wasta, favoritism, and nepotism	26%	16%	13%	18%
Embezzlement of public funds	14%	18%	16%	16%
Abuse of power	10%	13%	18%	14%
Bribery for public services	14%	15%	10%	13%
Breach of trust	10%	13%	12%	12%
Corruption-related money laundering	8%	7%	10%	8%
Negligence in public office	6%	5%	8%	6%
Influence peddling	4%	6%	6%	5%
Graft	6%	5%	5%	5%
Failure to disclose conflicts of interest	3%	2%	3%	2%

Figure 3.1: Most prevalent corruption crimes in oPt (by average)



A comparison with the 2023 survey results indicates a slight decrease in the percentage of respondents identifying wasta, favoritism, and nepotism as the most prevalent crime, dropping to 18 percent from 19 percent in 2023. The percentages for other crimes remained largely unchanged. Further details are provided in the table below.

Table 3.1(a): Corruption crimes most prevalent in Palestine, 2022–24

	2022	2023	2024
Wasta (abuse of connections), favoritism, and nepotism	21.3%	18%	18%
Embezzlement of public funds	15.4%	15%	16%
Breach of trust	9.4%	13%	12%
Abuse of power	11.6%	13%	14%
Bribery for public services	13.7%	11%	13%
Corruption-related money laundering	9.5%	8%	8%
Negligence in public office	6.6%	7%	6%
Failure to disclose conflicts of interest	4.1%	4%	2%
Influence peddling	4.2%	5%	5%
Graft	3.8%	5%	5%
	100%	100%	100%


3.2. Food and medicine corruption in 2024

Survey results indicate that 80 percent of respondents believe corruption in food and medicine increased in 2024 (82 percent in the West Bank and 77 percent in the Gaza Strip). Meanwhile, 20 percent believe it decreased (18 percent in the West Bank and 23 percent in the Gaza Strip). For additional details, refer to the table and figure below.

Table 3.2: Food corruption crimes, 2024

Sector	oPt	West Bank	Gaza Strip
Increased	80%	82%	77%
Decreased	20%	18%	23%
	100%	100%	100%

Figure 3.2: Food and Medicine corruption crimes, 2024




A comparison of AMAN's current survey results with previous surveys reveals a notable rise in the percentage of respondents perceiving an increase in food and medicine corruption crimes during the last two surveys compared to earlier years. For more information, refer to the table and figure below.

Table 3.2(a): Food corruption crimes (comparative data, 2020–24)

	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
Increased	59%	70%	74%	80%	80%
Decreased	41%	30%	26%	20%	20%
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Figure 3.2(a): Food corruption crimes (comparative data, 2020–24)




3.3. Drivers of increased food and medicine corruption in 2024

The survey identifies key factors behind the rise in food and medicine corruption in 2024. A significant portion of respondents (29 percent) cite the lack of accountability and prosecution as the primary drivers. Wasta, favoritism, nepotism, and cronyism are closely followed by 24 percent of respondents. Another 22 percent attribute the problem to the absence of deterrent penalties in the applicable corpse of legislation. The overlapping and multiplicity of roles among government agencies and public institutions responsible for monitoring food and medicine issues are highlighted by 14 percent, while 12 percent identify limited public awareness of these crimes as a contributing factor. For further details, refer to the table and figure below.

Table 3.3: Drivers of increased food and medicine corruption, 2024

	1st significant factor	2nd most significant factor	3rd most significant factor	Average
Lack of accountability and prosecution for food and medicine corruption crimes	26%	33%	27%	29%
Wasta (abuse of connections), favoritism, nepotism, and cronyism	27%	25%	25%	26%
Inadequate deterrent legal penalties	21%	18%	22%	20%
Overlapping and multiple roles of responsible official entities	15%	11%	14%	14%
Limited public awareness	10%	13%	12%	12%

Figure 3.3: Drivers of increased food and medicine corruption, 2024



A comparison of AMAN's 2024 survey results with those of 2023 indicates consistency in some perceptions. The percentage of respondents citing inadequate legislative deterrents as a cause remains steady at 29 percent. However, there is a decline in the percentage of those attributing the issue to citizens' limited awareness, from 15 percent in 2022 to 12 percent in both 2023 and 2024. For more details, see the table below.

Table 3.3(a): Drivers of increased food and medicine corruption, 2022–24

	2022	2023	2024
Lack of accountability and prosecution for food and medicine corruption crimes	27.9%	29%	29%
Wasta, favoritism, nepotism, and cronyism	24.0%	24%	26%
Inadequate deterrent legal penalties	18.2%	22%	20%
Overlapping and multiple roles of responsible official entities	15.3%	12%	14%
Low public awareness	14.6%	12%	12%
	100%	100%	100%


### 3.4. Most effective penalties for food and medicine corruption crimes

Survey results underscore public support for decisive measures against food and medicine corruption, with 33 percent of respondents advocating for the revocation of the trade and industry licenses of corruption perpetrators (24 percent in the West Bank and 38 percent in Gaza). Also, 23 percent favor imprisonment and financial penalties (24 percent in the West Bank and 21 percent in Gaza); 13 percent suggest publishing a public blacklist of the corrupt (11 percent in the West Bank and 17 percent in Gaza). Notably, 31 percent call for implementing all these penalties concurrently (27 percent in the West Bank and 38 percent in Gaza). For more details, see the accompanying table and figure below.

Table 3.4: Effective penalties for food and medicine corruption crimes

	West Bank	Gaza Strip	oPt
Public blacklist of corrupt companies and entities	11%	17%	13%
Revocation of trade and industry licenses	38%	24%	33%
Imprisonment and financial penalties	24%	21%	23%
All the above [do not read this option for the respondents]	27%	38%	31%

Figure 3.4: Effective penalties for food and medicine corruption crimes




## 4. Drivers of Corruption in oPt

A significant 21 percent of respondents identify the weak commitment to the rule of law as the primary driver of corruption in oPt. Close behind is the insufficient accountability for high-ranking corrupt (17 percent). The immunity granted to certain persons and the Israeli occupation's creation of a corruption-prone environment follow at 13 percent each. Other contributing factors include the legislative council's dormancy and insufficient oversight (10 percent each), as well as political fragmentation between the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Weak civil society engagement in anti-corruption efforts (9 percent) and low public awareness of corruption forms (8 percent) were also cited. For more details, see the table and figure below.

Table 4: Drivers of corruption in oPt

	1st driver	2nd driver	3rd driver	Average
Lack of compliance with the rule of law	17%	21%	23%	20.5%
Lack of genuine accountability for senior officials	21%	17%	14%	17.2%
Corruption-prone environment under Israeli occupation (occupation's policies and practices)	18%	10%	10%	12.9%
Immunity granted to certain individuals	11%	14%	13%	12.5%
Inactive legislature and inactive monitoring and oversight institutions	7%	10%	13%	10%
Political division between West Bank and Gaza Strip	15%	9%	6%	9.7%
Weak civil society engagement in anti-corruption efforts	5%	9%	14%	9.2%
Low public awareness of corruption forms	6%	10%	8%	8%

Figure 4: Drivers of corruption in oPt





The 2024 survey reveals a notable increase in the percentage of respondents who attribute the spread of corruption to the lack of compliance with the rule of law—rising to 21 percent compared to 16 percent in 2022. Other factors showed little variation in the proportions of respondents identifying them as contributing factors to corruption. For further details, refer to the table below.

Table 4(a): Drivers of corruption in oPt, 2022–24

	2022	2023	2024
Noncompliance with the rule of law	15.7%	20.7%	20.5%
Inadequate, ingenuine accountability for senior officials	17.0%	16.6%	17.2%
Immunity granted to certain individuals	12.7%	12.1%	12.5%
Corruption-prone environment under Israeli occupation (occupation's policies and practices)	11.6%	11.8%	12.9%
Dormant legislature and inactive oversight agencies	12.2%	11.3%	10.0%
Low civil society engagement in anti-corruption efforts	9.6%	11.0%	9.2%
Low public awareness	9.8%	8.9%	8.0%
Political division between West Bank and Gaza Strip	10.7%	7.7%	9.7%
	100%	100%	100%

## 5. Corruption in Public Services


### 5.1. Public services most prone to corruption in 2024

Survey results concerning public services most prone to corruption in 2024 highlight promotions and appointments as the leading area, cited by 22 percent of respondents. Healthcare services follow at 20 percent, with humanitarian and social assistance, both in-kind and cash, at 18 percent. Permits, licenses, and authorizations rank next at 13 percent. Other services collectively account for less than 10 percent each. For further details, refer to the table and figure below.

Table 5.1: Public service areas most prone to corruption, 2024

	1st corruption-prone area	2nd corruption-prone area	3rd corruption-prone area	Average
Appointments and promotions	29%	23%	15%	22%
Healthcare services	14%	20%	26%	20%
humanitarian and social assistance (in-kind and cash)	21%	18%	16%	18%
Permits, licenses, and authorizations	13%	13%	12%	13%
Higher education	6%	8%	13%	9%
Customs and taxation	8%	8%	8%	8%
Water	4%	6%	6%	5%
Electricity	1%	3%	2%	2%
Telecommunications	3%	1%	2%	2%

Figure 5.1: Public service most prone to corruption, 2024



The 2024 survey results indicate minimal changes in the corruption-prone public service areas compared to 2023. Refer to the table below for more details.

Table 5.1(a): Public service areas most prone to corruption 2022–24

	2022	2023	2024
Appointments and promotions	21.2%	20%	22%
Healthcare services	15.1%	20%	20%
Humanitarian and social assistance (in-kind and cash)	18.4%	17%	18%
Permits, licenses, and authorizations	15.9%	12%	13%
Customs and taxation	7.8%	10%	8%
Electricity	4.4%	7.0%	2%
Higher education	4.4%	7%	9%
Telecommunications	2.6%	4%	2%
Water	4.4%	34%	2%
	100%	100%	100%


## 5.2. Accessibility of public records and information

In response to the accessibility of public records and data, 66 percent of respondents reported difficulty in accessing public records, with no variation between the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Conversely, 23 percent stated that public records and information are easily accessible (22 percent in the West Bank and 24 percent in Gaza). Further details are available in the table and figure below.

Table 5.2: Accessibility of public records, 2024

Sector	oPt	West Bank	Gaza Strip
Yes	23%	22%	24%
No	66%	67%	65%
No opinion/don't know	11%	11%	11%
	100%	100%	100%

Figure 5.2: Accessibility of public records, 2024



## 6. Use of Wasta to Access Public Services

This section explores the reliance on personal connections, or wasta—a form of favoritism or leveraging personal networks for preferential access to public services. It also examines the public behavior surrounding wasta and the reasons behind this malpractice.


### 6.1. Engagement with public institutions for services

Survey results show that 40 percent of respondents approached public institution(s) for services in 2024. The practice was notably higher in Gaza, 57 percent, compared to 28 percent in the West Bank. See the table and figure below for more details.

Table 6.1: Engagement with public institutions for services

Sector	oPt	West Bank	Gaza Strip
Yes	40%	28%	57%
No	60%	72%	43%
	100%	100%	100%

Figure 6.1: Engagement with public institutions for services




## 6.2. Use of wasta to access public services

In 2024, nearly half of the respondents (47 percent) who approached public institutions for services reported having to resort to wasta. This reliance was notably higher in Gaza (58 percent) compared to the West Bank (33 percent). For further details, refer to the table and figure below.

Table 6.2: Use of wasta to access public services, 2024

Sector	oPt	West Bank	Gaza Strip
Yes	47%	33%	58%
No	53%	67%	42%
	100%	100%	100%

Figure 6.2: Use of wasta to access public services, 2024




Comparative data from previous AMAN surveys show a slight increase in the use of wasta over the last three years, with a sharper rise compared to earlier periods. Refer to the table and figure for more information.

Table 6.2(a): Use of wasta to access public services, 2014–24

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
<b>Yes</b>	35%	26%	39%	34%	39%	37%	35%	45%	44%	43%	47%
<b>No</b>	66%	74%	61%	66%	61%	63%	65%	55%	56%	58%	53%
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Figure 6.2(a): Use of wasta to access public services, 2014–24




### 6.3. Reasons behind wasta

When asked why they resort to wasta, 20 percent of respondents point to bypassing lengthy bureaucratic procedures and delays as the main reason. An additional 19 percent cite concerns that corruption might enable others to claim services unfairly. Additional reasons include distrust in the integrity of service providers (18 percent) and fear of missing out on the service due to limited opportunities (also 18 percent)—14 percent describe view wasta as an obligation for acquaintances to help, while 12 percent see it as a cultural norm—one that is not widely regarded as problematic. For further details, refer to the table and figure below.

Table 6.3: Reasons behind wasta, 2024

	1st reason	2nd reason	3rd reason	Average
Lengthy bureaucratic procedures	15%	20%	25%	20%
Fear of others unfairly claiming services through corrupt practices	15%	20%	22%	19%
Distrust in the integrity of service providers	24%	17%	13%	18%
Fear of missing out on services due to limited opportunities	21%	19%	13%	18%
Obligation to help acquaintances (as a form of social assistance)	12%	13%	15%	14%
Cultural acceptance of wasta as a non-problematic practice	12%	11%	12%	12%

Figure 6.3: Reasons behind resorting to wasta, 2022–24



The 2024 findings reflect an increase in respondents citing distrust in the integrity of service providers as a primary driver behind reliance on wasta. For a detailed breakdown, refer to the table below.

Table 6.3(a): Reasons behind wasta, 2022–24

	2022	2023	2024
Lengthy bureaucratic procedures	15.6%	21.9%	20.1%
Fear of missing out on services due to limited opportunities	21.0%	18.2%	19.0%
Fear of others unfairly claiming services through corrupt practices	17.2%	18.0%	17.8%
Distrust in the integrity of service providers	18.0%	14.6%	18.0%
Cultural acceptance of wasta as a non-problematic practice	14.4%	13.8%	11.5%
Perception of wasta as an obligation to help acquaintances (as a form of social assistance)	11.2%	13.5%	13.5%
	100%	100%	100%


#### 6.4(a). Perceptions of the use of wasta in ordinary government appointments and promotions

A significant 83 percent of respondents believe that wasta plays a role in government ordinary staff appointments and promotions (94 percent in the West Bank and 67 percent in Gaza). See the table and figure below for further details.

Table 6.4(a): Perceptions of wasta in ordinary government appointments and promotions

Sector	oPt	West Bank	Gaza Strip
Yes	83%	94%	67%
No	13%	4%	27%
No opinion/don't know	4%	2%	6%

Figure 6.4(a): Perceptions of wasta in ordinary government appointments and promotions



#### - Perceptions of wasta in ordinary government appointments and promotions by selected variables

- Region: Belief in the prevalence of wasta or favoritism is highest among residents of southern West Bank (98 percent) and northern West Bank (90 percent), compared to residents of central West Bank (84 percent).
- Sector: Private sector employees report higher perceptions of favoritism in public ordinary appointments and promotions (85 percent) compared to public sector workers (80 percent) and NGO employees (59 percent).
- Income level: Respondents with monthly household incomes of ILS 4,500–5,500 express the strongest belief in prevalence of wasta or favoritism in public ordinary appointments and promotions (95 percent), compared to those earning below ILS 1,500 (73 percent).




#### 6.4(b). Public perception of favoritism in senior government appointments and promotions

According to the survey, 85 percent of respondents believe that wasta or favoritism influences appointments and promotions in senior government positions. This sentiment is more prevalent in the West Bank (94 percent) than in Gaza (72 percent). For further details, refer to the table and figure below.

Table 6.4(b): Public perception of wasta favoritism in senior government appointments and promotions, 2024

Sector	oPt	West Bank	Gaza Strip
Yes	85%	94%	72%
No	10%	3%	21%
No opinion/don't know	5%	3%	7%
	100%	100%	100%

Figure 6.4(b): Public perception of wasta or nepotism in senior government appointments and promotions, 2024



#### - Public perception of wasta or favoritism in senior government appointments and promotions by selected variables

- **Region:** Perception of the use of wasta or favoritism in senior government appointments and promotions is highest among southern West Bank residents (98 percent), followed by central (96 percent) and northern West Bank residents (90 percent).
- **Household income:** Respondents with monthly household incomes of ILS 4,500–5,500 report higher perception of wasta or favoritism in senior government appointments and promotions (90 percent) compared to those earning below ILS 1,500 (80 percent).

## 7. Gifts and Bribes

### 7.1. Public experiences with bribery and gift-giving in exchange for public services

As the survey figures stand, 17 percent of respondents, or their relatives, report having paid a bribe or offered a gift to a public official in exchange for a public service. This figure is significantly higher in Gaza (29 percent) compared to the West Bank (8 percent). For additional details, refer to the table below.

Table 7.1: Citizens' responses on paying bribes for public services, 2024


Sector	oPt	West Bank	Gaza Strip
Yes	17%	8%	29%
No	83%	92%	71%
	100%	100%	100%

Compared to the 2023 survey results, the 2024 findings highlight a decline in the percentage of respondents who report paying bribes or offering gifts, either directly or through relatives, to public officials in exchange for services. For further details, refer to the table and chart below.

Table 7.1(a): Citizens' responses on paying bribes for public services, 2020–24

	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
Yes	17.3%	16.5%	23.6%	28.5%	17%
No	82.7%	83.5%	76.4%	71.5%	83%
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Figure 7.1(a): Citizens' involvement in bribery to access public services, 2020–24




7.2. Sectors and services most prone to bribery

In response to the public services most prone to bribery, 28 percent of respondents identify healthcare services as the most affected, followed by permits, licenses, and authorizations at 27 percent, education services at 23 percent, electricity services at 9 percent, telecommunications services at 8 percent, and water services at 6 percent. For further details, refer to the table and chart below.

Table 7.2: Sectors and services most prone to bribery, 2024

Services	1st area prone to bribery	2nd	3rd	Average
Healthcare	22%	36%	25%	28%
Permits, licenses, and authorizations	47%	15%	18%	27%
Education	16%	26%	27%	23%
Electricity	5%	9%	11%	9%
Telecommunications	5%	9%	11%	8%
Water	4%	6%	8%	6%

Figure 7.2: Sectors and services most prone to bribery, 2024



Year-on-year comparisons (2024 vs. 2023) show:

- Permits, licenses, and authorizations saw a 4 percent increase in perceived susceptibility to bribery.
- Education recorded a 5 percent rise.
- Electricity experienced a 6 percent decline.
- Healthcare remained the most vulnerable sector, reinforcing public concern over persistent corruption.

For additional details, refer to the table below.

Table 7.2(a): Sectors and services most prone to bribery, 2022–24

Service(s)	2022	2023	2024
Healthcare	22.3%	27%	28%
Permits, licenses, and authorizations	25.6%	23%	27%
Education	19.4%	18%	23%
Electricity	10.5%	15%	9%
Telecommunications	9.9%	10%	8%
Water	7.3%	8%	6%
	100%	100%	100%

## 8. Media's Role in Curbing Corruption

This section is given over to the public perceptions of the media's role in combating corruption and identifies the most effective tools in this effort.


### 8.1. Palestinian media's role in exposing corruption in 2024

Nearly half of respondents (48 percent) find the media's efforts to uncover and spotlight corruption cases in 2024 to be effective or moderately effective (32 percent in the West Bank, 71 percent in Gaza). Meanwhile, 49 percent consider it ineffective (63 percent in the West Bank, 28 percent in Gaza). For additional details, refer to the table and figure below.

Table 8.1: Palestinian media's role in uncovering corruption, 2024

	oPt	West Bank	Gaza Strip
Effective	11%	6%	17%
Moderately effective	37%	26%	54%
Ineffective	49%	63%	28%
No opinion/don't know	3%	4%	1%
	100%	100%	100%

Figure 8.1: Palestinian media's role in uncovering corruption, 2024




Findings from this year's survey reveal no notable change in public perception of the media's effectiveness in unveiling corruption cases, with overall sentiment remaining consistent with the 53 percent average recorded in previous years. For more information, refer to the table and figure below.

Table 8.1(a): Palestinian media's role in uncovering corruption, 2016–24

	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
<b>Effective</b>	15%	19%	16%	11%	14%	12%	13%	13%	11%
<b>Moderately effective</b>	37%	42%	40%	38%	40%	39%	40%	39%	37%
<b>Ineffective</b>	46%	36%	42%	48%	45%	48%	45%	46%	49%
<b>No opinion/don't know</b>	3%	3%	2%	3%	2%	1%	2%	2%	3%
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Figure 8.1(a): Palestinian media's role in uncovering corruption (effective or moderately effective), 2016–24




## 8.2. Most effective media forms in exposing corruption in 2024

Survey results highlight that 50 percent of respondents consider digital media (online news agencies, radio, streaming channels, and social media) the most effective conduit for exposing corruption cases in 2024. This sentiment was consistent across the West Bank and Gaza. Audio media ranks second at 18 percent (14 percent in the West Bank and 23 percent in Gaza), followed by visual media at 14 percent (16 percent in the West Bank, 11 percent in Gaza). Only 11 percent of respondents cite print media as the most effective. For further details, refer to the table and figure below.

Table 8.2: Most effective media platforms for exposing corruption, 2024

	oPt	West Bank	Gaza Strip
Visual media	14%	16%	11%
Audio media	18%	14%	23%
Print media	11%	7%	16%
Digital media	50%	52%	47%
No opinion/don't know	8%	11%	3%
	100%	100%	100%

Figure 8.2: Most effective media platforms for exposing corruption, 2024



## 9. Public perceptions of corruption in the judiciary and the role of anti-corruption actors


### 9.1. Public perceptions of corruption in the judiciary (courts and prosecution)

Findings indicate that 68 percent of respondents receive corruption within the judiciary (judges, prosecutors, and staff). This position is notably more prevalent in the West Bank (78 percent) compared to Gaza (53 percent). For more information, refer to the table and figure below.

Table 9.1: Public perception of corruption in the judiciary, 2024

	oPt	West Bank	Gaza Strip
Yes	68%	78%	53%
No	22%	12%	36%
No opinion/don't know	10%	10%	11%
	100%	100%	100%

Figure 9.1: Public perception of corruption in the judiciary, 2024




The perception that corruption exists within the judiciary remains largely unchanged compared to AMAN's 2023 and 2020 surveys. However, a significant drop is observed when compared to the 2021 survey results. For further details, refer to the table and figure below.

Table 9.1(a): Public perception of corruption in the judiciary, 2020–24

	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
<b>Yes</b>	69%	76%	68%	66%	68%
<b>No</b>	24%	19%	27%	26%	22%
<b>No opinion/don't know</b>	7%	6%	6%	8%	10%
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Figure 9.1(a): Public perception of corruption in the judiciary, 2020–24



#### - Public perception of corruption in the judiciary by selected variables

- Region: Perceived corruption in the judiciary is most pronounced among respondents in the southern West Bank (86 percent), compared to the central West Bank (75 percent) and the northern West Bank (73 percent).
- Age groups: Younger respondents are less likely to perceive corruption in the judiciary, with 64 percent of those under 30 holding this position, compared to 72 percent of those aged 30–40.
- Income: Respondents with monthly incomes between ILS 4,500 and 5,500 report the highest perception of judicial corruption (87 percent) compared to those earning fewer than ILS 1,500 (56 percent).


#### 9.1(a). Independence of anti-corruption bodies in the West Bank

In response to the independence of anti-corruption bodies in the West Bank (e.g., Anti-Corruption Commission, State Audit and Administrative Control Bureau (SAACB)), 72 percent of respondents in the West Bank believe these bodies lack independence. Only 16 percent believe they do. For more information, refer to the table and figure below.

Table 9.1(a): Independence of anti-corruption bodies in the West Bank, 2024

	West Bank
Yes	16%
No	72%
No opinion/don't know	12%
	100%

Figure 9.1(a): Independence of anti-corruption bodies in the West Bank, 2024




Compared to AMAN's 2023 and 2022 surveys, the current survey highlights a significant increase in the public perceptions of anti-corruption institutions' lack of independence, reversing to levels observed in earlier years. For additional details, refer to the table and figure below.



Table 9.1(a): Independence of anti-corruption bodies in the West Bank, 2017–2024

	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
Yes	18%	16%	23%	19%	15%	33%	33%	16%
No	75%	80%	70%	77%	78%	57%	55%	72%
Don't know	7%	5%	7%	4%	7%	11%	12%	12%
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Figure 9.1(a): Public perception of anti-corruption bodies' lack of independence, West Bank, 2017–24



## 9.2(a). Actors most interfering with the modus operandi of anti-corruption bodies in the West Bank

Respondents in the West Bank who believe that anti-corruption bodies lack independence were asked to identify the two entities they consider most influential in undermining the independence of these bodies. Survey results indicate the following:


- 29 percent attribute the greatest interference to the prime ministry and the cabinet at large.
- 27 percent point to the presidency.
- 22 percent cite the Mol security forces.
- 12 percent identify governors and mayors.
- 11 percent highlight political party leaders.

For further details, refer to the table and figure below.

Table 9.2(a): Actors interfering with anti-corruption bodies in the West Bank, 2024

	Most interfering entity	Second-most interfering entity	Average
Prime ministry and cabinet ministers	29%	28%	29%
Presidency	28%	26%	27%
Mol security forces	24%	19%	22%
Governors and mayors	9%	14%	12%
Political party leaders	10%	12%	11%

Figure 9.2(a): Actors most interfering with anti-corruption bodies in the West Bank, 2024



Compared to AMAN’s 2023 survey, the results reveal an increase in the percentage of respondents who perceive interference from the presidency and the prime. Conversely, a decrease is noted in those attributing interference to Mol security forces. For more details, refer to the table below.

Table 9.2(a).1: Actors most interfering with anti-corruption bodies in the West Bank, 2022–24

	2022	2023	2024
Prime ministry and cabinet	27.1%	23%	29%
Presidency	17.4%	24%	27%
Mol security forces	25.8%	25%	22%
Governors and mayors	14.9%	15%	12%
Political party leaders	10.3%	10%	11%
	100%	100%	100%


9.3(a). Performance of anti-corruption bodies in the West Bank

Survey findings indicate that 35 percent of respondents in the West Bank perceive the efforts of anti-corruption bodies as effective or moderately effective. In contrast, 58 percent believe these efforts are ineffective. For further details, refer to the table and figure below.

Table 9.3(a): Performance of anti-corruption bodies in the West Bank, 2024

	West Bank
Yes	7%
No	28%
No opinion/don’t know	58%
No opinion/don’t know	7%
	100%

Figure 9.3(a): Performance of anti-corruption bodies in the West Bank, 2024



The 2024 survey reveals a decline in the proportion of respondents who perceive the performance of anti-corruption bodies in the West Bank as effective or moderately effective compared to the 2023 survey. Refer to the table below for more information.

Table 9.3(c): Performance of anti-corruption bodies in the West Bank, 2021–24

	2021	2022	2023	2024
<b>Effective</b>	3%	6%	13%	7%
<b>Moderately effective</b>	32%	41%	34%	28%
<b>Ineffective</b>	62%	49%	46%	58%
<b>No opinion/don't know</b>	3%	4%	7%	7%
	100%	100%	100%	100%

### 9.1(b). Independence of anti-corruption bodies in the Gaza Strip

Survey results from Gaza show that 31 percent of respondents believe anti-corruption entities (e.g., the Anti-Corruption and Financial Crimes Prosecution and SAACB) operate independently, while 64 percent believe these entities lack independence. For additional details, refer to the table and figure below.

Table 9.1(b): Independence of anti-corruption bodies in the Gaza Strip, 2024

	Gaza Strip
<b>Yes</b>	31%
<b>No</b>	64%
<b>No opinion/don't know</b>	5%
	100%


**9.2(b). Actors most interfering with the modus operandi of anti-corruption bodies in the Gaza Strip**

When asked to identify the two entities perceived as most interfering in the operations of anti-corruption bodies from a predefined list, respondents in Gaza cited Mol security agencies as the primary source of interference (29 percent). This was closely followed by political party leaders and the attorney general, both at 25 percent, and members of the legislative council, at 18 percent. Refer to the table and figure below for a detailed breakdown.

Table 9.2(b): Actors most interfering with anti-corruption bodies in the Gaza Strip, 2024

	Most interfering	Second-most interfering	Average
Mol security forces	29%	30%	29%
Political party leaders	35%	16%	25%
Attorney general	24%	27%	25%
Legislative council members	9%	27%	18%
Others	3%	1%	2%

Figure 9.2(b): Actors most interfering with anti-corruption bodies in the Gaza Strip, 2024



Compared to the 2023 survey, there is a significant decrease in the percentage of respondents who identify legislative council members as the most interfering actors. This proportion dropped to 18 percent in the current survey, compared to 26 percent in 2023. Refer to the table below for further details.

Table 9.2(b).1: Actors interfering with anti-corruption bodies in the Gaza Strip, 2022–24

	2022	2023	2024
Mol security forces	30%	28%	29%
Political party leaders	21%	23%	25%
Attorney general	26%	22%	25%
Legislative council members	21%	26%	18%
Other	0.8%	1%	2%
	100%	100%	100%


9.3(b). Performance of anti-corruption bodies in the Gaza Strip

In 2024, 71 percent of respondents in Gaza consider the efforts of anti-corruption entities as either effective or moderately effective. However, 27 percent still view these efforts as ineffective. Refer to the table and figure below for additional details.

Table 9.3(b): Performance of anti-corruption bodies in the Gaza Strip, 2024

	Gaza Strip
Effective	20%
Moderately effective	51%
Ineffective	27%
No opinion/don't know	1%
	100%

Figure 9.3(b): Performance of anti-corruption bodies in the Gaza Strip, 2024



Compared with previous surveys, 2024 figures show a consistent upward curve in the percentage of respondents who consider the performance of anti-corruption bodies as effective or moderately effective (71 percent). For further details, refer to the table below.

Table 9.3(b): Performance of anti-corruption bodies in the Gaza Strip, 2021–24

	2021	2022	2023	2024
Effective	13%	15%	10%	20%
Moderately effective	28%	46%	55%	51%
Ineffective	57%	37%	34%	27%
No opinion/don't know	2%	2%	1%	1%
	100%	100%	100%	100%


## 10. Civil society's Role in Combating Corruption

The survey highlights that 45 percent of respondents consider the contribution of civil society organizations (CSOs) to combating corruption as effective or moderately effective (52 percent in the West Bank and 35 percent in Gaza). On the other hand, 51 percent believe CSO efforts lack impact (37 percent in the West Bank and 60 percent in Gaza). More details are available in the table and figure below.

Table 10: CSO anti-corruption contributions, 2024

	oPt	West Bank	Gaza Strip
Effective	9%	13%	7%
Moderately effective	36%	49%	28%
Ineffective	51%	37%	60%
No opinion/don't know	4%	2%	6%
	100%	100%	100%

Figure 10: CSO anti-corruption contributions, 2024



Compared to the 2023 survey, this year's figures reflect a 4 percent decrease in the proportion of respondents who consider the CSO contributions as effective or moderately effective. For additional details, refer to the table below.

Table 10(a): CSO anti-corruption contributions, 2021–24

	2021	2022	2023	2024
Effective	49%	47%	49%	45%
Moderately effective	50%	51%	45%	51%
No opinion/don't know	1%	2%	6%	4%
	100%	100%	100%	100%

# 11. Corruption Reporting and Whistleblowing


## 11.1. Public perception of corruption reporting and whistleblowing

According to the survey, 33 percent of respondents believe that citizens generally report corruption when they encounter it (28 percent in the West Bank and 41 percent in Gaza). In contrast, 56 percent think that citizens do not report such cases (63 percent in the West Bank and 45 percent in Gaza). For detailed data, refer to the table and figure below.

Table 11.1: Public perception of corruption reporting and whistleblowing to anti-corruption authorities and agencies, 2024

	oPt	West Bank	Gaza Strip
Yes	33%	28%	41%
No	56%	63%	45%
No opinion/don't know	11%	9%	14%
	100%	100%	100%

Figure 11.1: Public perception of corruption reporting and whistleblowing to anti-corruption authorities and agencies, 2024



This year's figures continue to highlight that most citizens refrain from reporting corruption to competent anti-corruption authorities and agencies. This finding aligns with trends observed in prior surveys. Refer to the table and figure below for more data.

Table 11.1(a): Public perception of corruption reporting and whistleblowing to anti-corruption authorities and agencies, 2012–24

	2012	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
Yes	39%	32%	28%	33%	36%	33%	36%	32%	33%	39%	34%	33%
No	58%	63%	57%	57%	57%	58%	54%	60%	63%	55%	60%	56%
Don't know	3%	5%	0%	10%	7%	9%	10%	8%	4%	6%	6%	11%
		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

## 11.2. Corruption Reporting Scenarios


### 11.2(a). Reporting corruption as witnesses

When asked about reporting corruption as witnesses, 53 percent of respondents indicated they would report cases if personally affected (49 percent in the West Bank and 58 percent in Gaza). In contrast, 40 percent stated they would not report (44 percent in the West Bank and 34 percent in Gaza). Additional details are available in the table and figure below.

Table:11.2(a): Willingness to report corruption as witnesses, 2024

	oPt	West Bank	Gaza Strip
Yes	53%	49%	58%
No	40%	44%	34%
No opinion/don't know	7%	7%	8%
	100%	100%	100%

Figure 11.2(a): Willingness to report corruption as witnesses, 2024






Survey findings indicate a continuous decline since 2021 in the proportion of citizens willing to report corruption as witnesses. The rates, which ranged between 60 percent and 77 percent in earlier years, have consistently fallen in subsequent surveys, reaching 53 percent in the current survey. For more details, refer to the table below.

Table:11.2(a)1: Public willingness to report corruption as witnesses, 2012–2024

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
<b>Yes</b>	69%	69%	68%	67%	77%	66%	62%	67%	60%	54%	58%	54%	53%
<b>No</b>	28%	31%	27%	33%	23%	34%	38%	33%	40%	44%	42%	42%	40%
<b>Don't know</b>	3%	----	5%	----	----	----	----	----	----	2%	----	4%	7%
<b>oPt</b>	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Figure:11.2(a)1: Public willingness to report corruption as witnesses, 2012–2024




### 11.2(b). Reporting corruption as victims

When asked about reporting corruption as victims, 60 percent of respondents stated they would report corruption cases if they were directly affected (59 percent in the West Bank and 62 percent in Gaza). Conversely, 34 percent indicated they would not report (36 percent in the West Bank and 31 percent in Gaza). For further details, see the table and figure below.

Table:11.2(b): Public willingness to report corruption as victims, 2024

	oPt	West Bank	Gaza Strip
<b>Yes</b>	60%	59%	62%
<b>No</b>	34%	36%	31%
<b>No opinion/don't know</b>	6%	5%	7%
	100%	100%	100%

Figure:11.2(b): Public willingness to report corruption as victims, 2024




In contrast to earlier surveys, where reporting rates as victims averaged 72 percent since 2012, this year's findings highlight a decline to 60 percent. Detailed data are presented in the table and figure below.

Table:11.2(b)2: Public willingness to report corruption as victims, 2012–24

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
<b>Yes</b>	73%	68%	75%	79%	77%	60%	71%	77%	71%	71%	65%	61%	60%
<b>No</b>	23%	31%	21%	21%	23%	40%	29%	23%	29%	28%	35%	35%	34%
<b>Don't know</b>	4%	---	4%	---	---	---	---	----	----	1%	----	4%	6%
<b>oPt</b>	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Figure:11.2(b)1: Public willingness to report corruption as victims, 2012–24



11.3. Public Perspectives on Corruption Reporting

The survey reveals diverse views among respondents regarding reporting corruption:


- 33 percent consider corruption reporting a citizen's right to exercise freely (39 percent in the West Bank and 23 percent in Gaza hold this position).
- 56 percent believe it is a legal duty (53 percent in the West Bank and 59 percent in Gaza).
- 12 percent perceive it as socially unacceptable (7 percent in the West Bank and 18 percent in Gaza).

For further details, refer to the table and figure below.

Table 11.3: Public perspectives on corruption reporting, 2024

	oPt	West Bank	Gaza Strip
Right to exercise freely	33%	39%	23%
Legal duty	56%	53%	59%
Socially unacceptable practice (perceived as informing on others)	12%	7%	18%
	100%	100%	100%

Figure 11.3: Public perspectives on corruption reporting, 2024




Compared to previous surveys, the 2024 survey results reveal that the proportion of those who consider reporting corruption as a right declined to 33 percent, down from the average of 38 percent. Meanwhile, the percentage considering it a legal duty has remained steady at 55 percent, consistent with the average over prior years. Detailed results are available in the table and figure below.

Table:11.3(a): Public willingness to report corruption as victims, 2012–24

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
<b>Right to exercise freely</b>	61%	27%	32%	26%	38%	42%	42%	43%	45%	39%	31%	34%	33%
<b>Legal duty</b>	35%	68%	61%	70%	56%	52%	53%	53%	46%	50%	59%	53%	56%
<b>Socially unacceptable practice</b>	2%	5%	2%	4%	6%	6%	5%	4%	9%	10%	10%	14%	12%
<b>Don't know</b>	2%	---	5%	---	---	---	---	---	---	2%	---	---	---
<b>oPt</b>	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Figure:11.3(a): Public willingness to report corruption as victims, 2012–24



## 12. Barriers to Corruption Reporting

The survey identified several factors hindering citizens from reporting corruption. Respondents were asked to choose the top three barriers from a pre-defined list:


- 19 percent emphasized the lack of adequate protection for whistleblowers and witnesses as the primary obstacle.
- 17 percent highlighted insufficient public awareness about the definition and forms of corruption.
- 13 percent expressed skepticism about the effectiveness of reporting, with concerns that corrupt individuals would evade accountability.
- 12 percent feared retaliation as a critical reason.
- 11 percent pointed to uncertainty regarding the authorized bodies for lodging corruption complaints.
- Other reasons were less prominent, with no single factor surpassing 10 percent.

For further details, refer to the table and figure below.

Table 12: Public perceived barriers to corruption reporting, 2024

	1st barrier	2nd barrier	3rd barrier	Average
Lack of adequate protection for whistleblowers and witnesses	16%	21%	19%	19%
Low public awareness of corruption definition and forms	16%	17%	20%	17%
Doubts about reporting effectiveness, believing the corrupt would evade accountability	15%	12%	12%	13%
Fear of retaliation	16%	12%	9%	12%
Lack of knowledge about the competent authority for receiving and addressing corruption complaints	8%	11%	13%	11%
Inability to substantiate corruption cases	9%	8%	8%	8%
Weak complaint mechanisms in public institutions	7%	8%	6%	7%
Lack of political will to combat corruption and prosecute perpetrators	6%	6%	7%	6%
Perception of corruption reporting as a form of informing (denunciation)	4%	4%	5%	5%
Lack of accessible public records	2%	1%	3%	2%

Figure 12: Public perceived barriers to corruption reporting (average), 2024



Compared to the 2023 survey, there was a notable rise in the concerns about inadequate protection for whistleblowers and witnesses, increasing from 16 percent in 2023 to 19 percent this year. Other reasons remained relatively unchanged compared to previous years. For more details, refer to the table below.

Table 12: Public perceived barriers to corruption reporting, 2022–24

	2022	2023	2024
Lack of adequate protection for whistleblowers and witnesses	11%	18%	17%
Low public awareness of corruption definition and forms	16%	16%	19%
Skepticism about reporting effectiveness, believing the corrupt would evade accountability	11%	12%	13%
Fear of retaliation	13%	11%	12%
Lack of knowledge about the competent authority for receiving and addressing corruption complaints	10%	10%	8%
Inability to substantiate corruption cases	9.8%	10%	11%
Weak complaint mechanisms in public institutions	10.4%	9%	5%
Lack of political will to combat corruption and prosecute perpetrators	9.4%	8%	7%
Perceiving corruption reporting as a form of informing (denunciation)	6.2%	5%	6%
Lack of accessible public records	2.7%	%2	2%
	100%	100%	100%

## 13. Anti-Corruption Efforts


### 13.1. Corruption combatting efforts

Survey findings reveal that 87 percent of respondents believe that current anti-corruption efforts in oPt are inadequate (92 percent in the West Bank, 81 percent in the Gaza Strip). Only 10 percent of respondents consider these efforts adequate (5 percent in the West Bank, 17 percent in the Gaza Strip). For more details, refer to the table and figure below.

Table 13.1: Anti-corruption efforts and initiatives, 2024

	oPt	West Bank	Gaza Strip
Adequate	10%	%5	%17
Inadequate	87%	%92	%81
No opinion/don't know	3%	%3	%2
	100%	100%	100%

Figure 13.1: Anti-corruption efforts and initiatives, 2024



Comparing these figures to AMAN's previous surveys underscores a persistent perception of inadequacy in anti-corruption measures, marking a 5 percent increase from the average of 82 percent recorded in previous years. For further details, refer to the table below.

Table 13.1(a): Anti-corruption efforts and initiatives, 2015–2024

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
Adequate	11%	22%	13%	14%	12%	19%	15%	13%	11%	10%
Inadequate	80%	73%	82%	83%	84%	80%	84%	85%	87%	87%
No opinion/don't know	9%	5%	6%	3%	5%	2%	1%	2%	2%	3%
oPt	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

#### - Perceptions of the Effectiveness of Anti-Corruption Efforts

- Region: Central West Bankers are the most critical, with 93 percent considering anti-corruption efforts as inadequate, followed by the northern West Bank (90 percent) and the southern West Bank (83 percent).
- Type of residential area: Villages report the highest dissatisfaction at 90 percent, compared to 86 percent in urban areas and 87 percent in refugee camps.

## 13.2. Anti-Corruption Challenges

Respondents identifying anti-corruption measures in Palestine as inadequate point to several critical barriers:


- 23 percent attribute this to a lack of political will for prosecuting corruption perpetrators (18 percent in the West Bank, 32 percent in Gaza).
- 27 percent highlight a lack of transparency in state institutional governance (34 percent in the West Bank, 17 percent in Gaza).
- 29 percent cite nondeterrent penalties for corruption crimes (29 percent in the West Bank, 30 percent in Gaza).
- 20 percent emphasize the absence of exemplary leadership and commitment to integrity by public officials (19 percent in the West Bank, 21 percent in Gaza).

For further details, refer to the table and figure below.

Table 13.2: Barriers to committed, effective anti-corruption efforts, 2024

	oPt	West Bank	Gaza Strip
Lack of solid political will to prosecute corruption perpetrators	23%	18%	32%
Lack of transparency in state institutional governance	27%	34%	17%
Nondeterrent penalties for corruption crimes	29%	29%	30%
Absence of exemplary leadership and commitment to integrity values	20%	19%	21%
	100%	100%	100%

Figure 13.2: Barriers to committed, effective anti-corruption efforts, 2024





## 14. Changes in Corruption Levels

This section explores public perceptions of corruption changes during 2023 and expectations for 2024.


### 14.1. Perceived changes in corruption levels in 2024

The survey reveals that 66 percent of respondents believe corruption took an upward curve in 2024 (68 percent in the West Bank and 63 percent in Gaza). Only 8 percent believe corruption declined (4 percent in the West Bank and 14 percent in Gaza). Nearly a quarter of respondents (24 percent) see no change (25 percent in the West Bank and 22 percent in Gaza). For further details, see the table and figure below.

Table 14.1: Perceived changes in corruption levels, 2024

	oPt	West Bank	Gaza Strip
Increased	66%	68%	63%
Decreased	8%	4%	14%
Same	24%	25%	22%
No opinion/don't know	2%	3%	1%
	100%	100%	100%

Figure 14.1: Perceived changes in corruption levels, 2023




Compared to previous AMAN surveys, these findings show an increase in the percentage of respondents who perceive a rise in corruption, nearing the overall average of 54 percent and reflecting a 14-point increase from the 2023 survey. For further details, refer to the table and figure below.

Table 14.1(a): Perceived increase in corruption levels, 2013–24

	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
Increased	52%	54%	51%	55%	55%	67%	53%	53%	58%	48%	52%	66%
Decreased	18%	12%	11%	15%	16%	11%	12%	14%	11%	18%	15%	8%
Remained the same	27%	31%	33%	27%	27%	21%	32%	29%	29%	32%	32%	24%
Don't know	3%	3%	6%	3%	3%	2%	4%	3%	1%	2%	2%	2%
oPt	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Figure 14.1(a): Perceived increase in corruption levels, 2013–24




## 14.2. Corruption outlook for 2025

Citizen projections for corruption in 2025 reveal persistent concerns, with 56 percent of respondents expecting a rise (67 percent in the West Bank, 39 percent in Gaza). Only 13 percent foresee a decline (7 percent in the West Bank, 21 percent in Gaza), while 19 percent see no change (15 percent in the West Bank, 24 percent in Gaza). Further details can be found in the table and figure below.

Table 14.2: Corruption outlook for 2025

	oPt	West Bank	Gaza Strip
Will decrease	13%	7%	21%
Will increase	56%	67%	39%
Will not change	19%	15%	24%
No opinion/don't know	13%	7%	21%
	100%	100%	100%

Figure 14.2: Corruption outlook for 2025




Respondents' outlook remains pessimistic regarding a decrease in corruption levels for 2025. Expectations for increased corruption stand at 56 percent, marking a notable rise from 49 percent in 2022 and a one-point increase above the general average (55 percent). For a more detailed breakdown, refer to the table and figure below.

Table 14.2(a): Corruption projections, 2016–24

	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
<b>Will decrease</b>	13%	13%	9%	11%	14%	13%	13%	13%	13%
<b>Will increase</b>	52%	50%	62%	60%	55%	59%	49%	57%	56%
<b>Will not change</b>	27%	28%	23%	22%	21%	23%	27%	24%	19%
<b>No opinion/don't know</b>	8%	9%	6%	8%	10%	5%	11%	7%	13%
<b>oPt</b>	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Figure 14.2(a): Corruption projections, 2016–24



## Appendix 1: Survey Questionnaire

### Survey on the Public Perception of Corruption and Anti-Corruption Landscape in Occupied Palestinian Territory 2024

#### • General Information

Questionnaire form no. \_\_\_\_\_ Researcher ID \_\_\_\_\_

Region

1. West Bank                      2. Gaza Strip

District/Governorate

1. Jenin              2. Tubas              3. Tulkarm              4. Qalqilya              5. Salfit              6. Nablus              7. Ramallah  
8. Jerusalem      9. Jericho              10. Bethlehem              11. Hebron              12. North Gaza              13. Gaza  
14. Central Gaza              15. Khan Younis              16. Rafah

Worksite Location (Residential Cluster) \_\_\_\_\_

Place of Residence

1. City                      2. Village/Town                      3. Refugee Camp

#### • Sample

Gender:              1. Male                      2. Female

Individual #	Age (18 years or older)	Age	Household Serial Number															
			1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
1			1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
2			2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1
3			3	2	1	3	2	1	3	2	1	3	2	1	3	2	1	3
4			4	3	2	1	4	3	2	1	4	3	2	1	4	3	2	1
5			5	4	3	2	1	5	4	3	2	1	5	4	3	2	1	5
6			6	5	4	3	2	1	6	5	4	3	2	1	6	5	4	3

#### Q.1. Palestinian Citizens' Priorities

The Palestinian society and government face pressing challenges that demand immediate attention. In your opinion, which issue should be given the highest priority for resolution?

1. Escalating economic crises
2. Widespread corruption
3. Weak rule of law (including protection of rights and public freedoms)
4. Fragile infrastructure
5. Persistent political division
6. Israeli occupation's policies and practices

**Q.2. Corruption can permeate nations, societies, and sectors, whether public, private, or NGO.**

Corruption is defined as the misuse of power granted to an official by virtue of their position to achieve personal gains

(2.1). In your opinion, how widespread is corruption in Palestinian society?

1. High
2. Moderate
3. Low
4. No opinion/don't know

(2.2). From your perspective, who are the primary perpetrators of corruption in oPt?

1. Senior political officials (upper-level positions)
2. Ordinary staff (lower-level positions)

(2.3). How would you rank the following sectors according to the level of corruption?

(Use 4 for the sector you believe has the highest corruption and 1 for the sector with the least corruption.)

- a. Government agencies and institutions
- b. Local government units (municipalities and local councils)
- c. Private sector (companies managing public facilities/services)
- d. NGOs and charities

(2.4). In your opinion, which of the following institutions or official entities are most prone to corruption? (Please select the three entities you believe are most exposed to corruption.)

1. Executive authority (cabinet, ministries, and public agencies)
2. Legislature (Palestinian Legislative Council) [Researcher: ask in Gaza only]
3. Judiciary (courts and public prosecution)
4. Mol security agencies
5. Local government units (municipalities and village councils)
6. Religious institutions (sharia and ecclesiastical courts and endowments)
7. Presidency

(2.5). Which three ministries or government agencies do you think face the highest levels of corruption? (Please select the top three from the following list.)

1. Ministry of Social Development
2. Ministry of Health
3. Ministry of Transport and Communications
4. Ministry of Awqaf and Religious Affairs
5. Ministry of Finance
6. Water Authority
7. Ministry of Education
8. Energy Authority
9. Security agencies
10. General Authority of Civil Affairs
11. Land Authority
12. Land and Water Settlement Commission
13. Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research
14. Ministry of Telecommunications and Information Technology
15. Ministry of National Economy
16. Authority of Crossings and Borders

### Q.3. Corruption crimes in Palestine

(3-1) Under Palestinian law, corruption crimes include breach of trust, embezzlement of public funds, abuse of power, bribery, corruption-related money laundering, wasta (favoritism) and nepotism, negligence in public office, and illicit gain.

In your opinion, which of the following crimes are the most prevalent in oPt? (Please choose three):

1. Breach of trust
2. Embezzlement of public funds
3. Abuse of power
4. Corruption-related money laundering
5. Conflict of interest<sup>1</sup>
6. Favoritism and nepotism (wasta)
7. Bribery for public services or undue benefits
8. Influence peddling<sup>2</sup>
9. Negligence in public office
10. Illicit gain<sup>3</sup>

(3.2). Crimes involving corruption in the food and medicine sectors are considered economic crimes.

In your opinion, during 2024, did such crimes:

1. Increased [proceed to the next question]
2. Decreased [skip to 4.3]

(3.3). Rank the top three factors you believe contributed to the rise of corruption in the food and medicine sectors in oPt:

1. Lack of accountability or prosecution for perpetrators
2. Use of wasta, favoritism, and nepotism to overlook such crimes
3. Inadequate deterrent penalties in applicable legislation
4. Low public awareness about these crimes
5. Overlapping and multiple roles of official entities entrusted with food and medicine oversight

(4.3). In your opinion, which of the following penalties do you think is the most effective in holding perpetrators of food and medicine corruption accountable?

1. A public blacklist of the companies and entities involved in these crimes
2. Revocation of their trade/industrial licenses
3. Imprisonment and fining
4. All of the above [Researcher: do not read this option to the respondent]

---

<sup>1</sup> Conflict of interest, a scenario where a decision-maker's objectivity and independence are compromised by a personal interest—whether financial, moral, or otherwise—that pertains to them, a close family member, or an associate. It also arises when personal considerations, direct or indirect, or privileged access to relevant information affects their duties in public office. This definition is outlined in the Conflict-of-Interest Regulation No. 1 of 2020.

<sup>2</sup> Influence peddling, commonly referred to as traffic of influence or trading in influence, occurs when an employee or any other individual, directly or indirectly, seeks or accepts an undue benefit for themselves or another person, leveraging their actual or assumed influence to secure an undue advantage from a public authority or administration.

<sup>3</sup> Graft, any wealth gained by individuals governed under this decree, whether for themselves or others, through misuse of their position or authority. It also includes any disproportionate increase in wealth after assuming office or acquiring the position, whether for the individual themselves, their spouse, or their minor children, that cannot be accounted for by legitimate sources.

#### **Q.4. Drivers of Corruption in Palestine**

Please rank the following factors according to their significance in contributing to the spread of corruption in oPt.

(Please select the three factors you believe have the greatest impact):

1. Lack of solid commitment to the rule of law
2. Inactivity of the legislative council and oversight bodies
3. Weak engagement of civil society in anti-corruption efforts
4. Israeli occupation's policies that foster a corruption-prone environment
5. Inadequate accountability for high-ranking corrupt officials
6. Low public awareness of corruption and its forms
7. Political division between the West Bank and Gaza Strip
8. Immunity granted to certain individuals

#### **Q. 5. Corruption in Public Services**

(5.1) Public institutions deliver a variety of essential services. In your opinion, which of the following services experienced the highest prevalence of corruption in 2024?

(Select up to three services where corruption was most prevalent in 2024):

1. Healthcare
2. Public sector appointments and promotions
3. Higher education
4. Humanitarian and social assistance (cash and in-kind)
5. Customs and taxation
6. Water services
7. Official permits, licenses, and approvals
8. Electricity services
9. Telecommunications

(5.2) In your opinion, is it easy for citizens to access information from public records?<sup>4</sup>

1. Yes
2. No
3. No opinion/don't know

#### **Q. 6. Reliance on Wasta to Access Public Services**

(6.1) In 2024, did you reach out to any public institution, agency, or facility seeking a public service?

1. Yes
2. No [skip to question 6.3]

(6-2) Did you need to rely on wasta to secure public service in 2024?

1. Yes
2. No

---

<sup>4</sup> Public Records, any paper, correspondence, forms, photographs, audio recordings, maps, documents, manuscripts, public files, or any readable material or digital media—regardless of format or characteristics—maintained by public institutions. Public records exclude items classified as confidential, personal, or competitively sensitive.

(6.3) People often turn to wasta for different reasons. In your opinion, what are the top three reasons from the list below?

1. To avoid lengthy bureaucratic procedures and save time
2. Fear that corruption might allow someone else to unfairly take the service
3. As a form of assistance that acquaintances are obligated to provide
4. Cultural norms that do not consider waste as wrongdoing
5. Fear of missing out on the service due to limited availability
6. Lack of trust in the integrity of service providers

(6.4) Do you think wasta or favoritism exists in the following processes?

6.4(a) Ordinary government staff appointments and promotions

1. Yes
2. No
3. No opinion/don't know

(6-4b) Senior government appointments and promotions

1. Yes
2. No
3. No opinion/don't know

#### **Q. 7. Bribery**

(7.1) Have you or a close relative ever paid a bribe or offered a benefit (such as cash, a gift, or a service) to a public official or been asked to do so in exchange for a public service?

4. Yes
5. No

(7.2) In your opinion, which three sectors or services are the most vulnerable to bribery in oPt?

1. Healthcare
2. Education
3. Official permits, licenses, and approvals
4. Electricity
5. Telecommunications
6. Water

#### **Q. 8: Media's Role in Curbing Corruption**

(8.1) How would you rate the role of Palestinian media in uncovering and reporting on corruption cases in 2024?

1. Effective
2. Moderately effective
3. Ineffective
4. No opinion/Don't know

(8.2) In your opinion, which type of media was the most effective in exposing corruption cases in 2024?

1. Visual media
2. Audio media
3. Print media
4. Digital media (including online news agencies, radio stations, streaming channels, and social media platforms)
5. No opinion/Don't know



**Q. 9.**

(9.1) Do you believe there is corruption within the judiciary (including judges, prosecutors, and other staff of courts and public prosecution)?

1. Yes
2. No
3. No opinion/Don't know

The State of Palestine has established several official bodies to uphold integrity and combat corruption, such as the Anti-Corruption Commission in the West Bank, the Anti-Corruption and Financial Crimes Prosecution in Gaza, and the State Audit and Administrative Control Bureau. Granted independence, these institutions' modus operandi and decisions should be shielded from political or external influence.

[For West Bank respondents only]

(9.1(a)). In your opinion, do institutions mandated to combat corruption (e.g., the Anti-Corruption Commission and the State Audit and Administrative Control Bureau) perform their roles and responsibilities independently?

1. Yes [skip to question 9.3(a)]
2. No
3. No opinion/don't know

(9.2(a)). If your answer to the previous question was "No," please select the two entities you believe interfere most in the work of anti-corruption bodies:

1. Presidency
2. Prime ministry and cabinet ministers
3. Political party leaders
4. Governors and mayors
5. Ministry of Interior security forces

(9.3(a)). How would you rate the performance of anti-corruption institutions and agencies (e.g., the Anti-Corruption Commission and the State Audit and Administrative Control Bureau)?

1. Effective
2. Moderately effective
3. Ineffective
4. No opinion/don't know

[For Gaza Strip respondents only]

(9.1(b)). In your opinion, do institutions mandated to combat corruption in the Gaza Strip (e.g., the Anti-Corruption and Financial Crimes Prosecution, the State Audit and Administrative Control Bureau) perform their roles and responsibilities independently?

1. Yes [skip to 9.3(a)]
2. No
3. No opinion/don't know

(9.2(b)). If your answer to the previous question was "No," please select the two entities you believe interfere most in the work of anti-corruption bodies:

1. Legislative council members
2. Attorney general
3. Mol security forces
4. Political party leaders
5. Others (specify: \_\_\_\_\_)

(9.3(b)). How would you rate the performance of anti-corruption institutions and agencies (e.g., the Anti-Corruption and Financial Crimes Prosecution, the State Audit and Administrative Control Bureau)?

1. Effective
2. Moderately effective
3. Ineffective
4. No opinion/don't know

#### **Q. 10. Civil Society's Role in Combating Corruption**

In your opinion, how do you assess the contribution of civil society organizations (CSOs) to combating corruption?

1. Effective
2. Moderately effective
3. Ineffective
4. No opinion/don't know

#### **(Q. 11). Corruption Reporting**

(11.1). Do you think citizens typically report corruption cases they observe to the responsible anti-corruption bodies (e.g., the Anti-Corruption Commission, the Anti-Corruption and Financial Crimes Prosecution, or the State Audit and Administrative Control Bureau)?

1. Yes
2. No
3. No opinion/don't know

(11.2) If you encountered an act of corruption, would you report it to the relevant anti-corruption entities if you were:

(11.2(a)). A witness to corruption

1. Yes
2. No

(11.2(b)). A victim of corruption

1. Yes
2. No

(11.3) Do you believe that reporting corruption is:

1. A right that you are free to exercise
2. A legal duty that you are obligated to perform
3. A socially disapproved practice (e.g., denunciation, informing on others)

#### **Q. 12. Barriers to Reporting Corruption**

Many factors can hinder reporting corruption to relevant authorities. (Please select the top three reasons that, in your opinion, are the most significant barriers to reporting corruption.)

1. Low public awareness of corruption definition and forms
2. Lack of knowledge about which entity is responsible for receiving and handling corruption complaints
3. Inadequate protections for whistleblowers and witnesses
4. Doubts about the effectiveness of reporting, believing no action would be taken against the corrupt
5. Inability to substantiate corruption cases with evidence
6. The perception that reporting the corrupt is a form of denunciation or akin to informant behavior
7. Weak complaint mechanisms in public institutions
8. Fear of retaliation
9. Lack of political will to combat corruption and hold perpetrators accountable
10. Limited access to public records

### **Q. 13. Anti-Corruption Efforts**

(13.1). Do you believe that anti-corruption efforts in Palestine are:

1. Adequate [proceed to Question 14]
2. Inadequate
3. No opinion/don't know

(13.2) If you answered "Inadequate" to the previous question, what do you think is the main barrier to effective anti-corruption efforts in Palestine?

1. Lack of transparency in state institutional governance (e.g., limited public access to information about exposed corruption cases and accountability measures, lack of public awareness about anti-corruption efforts, corruption crimes, and Palestinian anti-corruption legislation)
2. Lack of solid political will to prosecute corruption perpetrators (e.g., lack of effective legislative and judicial authority and the absence of robust accountability measures for senior officials)
3. Nondeterrent penalties for corruption crimes
4. Lack of exemplary leadership and commitment to integrity values, public interests, and preservation of resources

(14.1). In your opinion, has the level of corruption changed during 2024?

1. Yes, it increased
2. Yes, it decreased
3. It remained the same
4. No opinion/don't know

(14.2). What are your expectations for the levels of corruption in 2025?

1. Will decrease
2. Will increase
3. Will remain the same
4. No opinion/I do not know

### **• Demographic Information**

Age

1. Under 30
2. 30–40
3. Over 40

Educational Level

1. Illiterate/Literate
2. Primary
3. Preparatory
4. Secondary
5. College/diploma
6. Bachelor's degree
7. Master's degree or Higher

Employment Status

1. Employed
2. Unemployed

Work Sector (for employed respondents only)

1. Public/government sector
2. Private sector
3. Nongovernmental organization sector (NGOs)
4. UNRWA
5. International organizations

Monthly Household Income (in ILS)

1. Less than 1,500
2. 1,500–2,500
3. 2,501–3,500
4. 3,501–4,500
5. 4,501–5,500
6. More than 5,500

## Appendix 2: Survey Sample Results

		Percentage
<b>Area of Residence:</b>	The West Bank	%57.1
	Gaza Strip	%42.9
	Total	%100
<b>Governorate:</b>	Jenin	%6.9
	Tubas	%2.3
	Tulkarm	%3.4
	Qalqilya	%2.3
	Salfit	%2.3
	Nablus	%6.8
	Ramallah	%6.8
	Jerusalem	%8.0
	Jericho	%2.3
	Bethlehem	%4.6
	Hebron	%11.6
	Jabalial	%5.9
	Gaza City	%15.8
	Khan Yunis	%11.1
	Deir al Balah	%7.1
	Rafah	%3.0
	Total	%100
<b>Sex:</b>	Male	%50
	Female	%50
	Total	%100

<b>Age groups:</b>	<b>Younger than 30</b>	<b>%37.6</b>
	30-40	%26.4
	Older than 40	%36.1
	Total	%100
<b>Educational level:</b>	Illiterate	8.%
	Elementary	%4.2
	Preparatory	%15.3
	High school	%35.4
	College/Institute	%12.1
	baccalaureate	%30.5
	Master's degree or higher	%1.7
	Total	%100
<b>Employment status:</b>	Employed	%43.9
	Unemployed	%56.1
	Total	%100
<b>(for employees only) Labor sector:</b>	Public sector	%27.2
	Private sector	%59.2
	governmen--Non (tal sector (NGO	%3.9
	UNRWA	%6.2
	International Organization	%3.6
	Total	%100

<b>Average monthly household income (NIS):</b>	<b>Less than 1500</b>	<b>37.6%</b>
	501-2500	33.1%
	2501-3500	18.8%
	3501-4500	7.4%
	4501-5500	2.1%
	More than 5500	1.0%
	Total	%100



**AMAN was established in 2000 as a civil society organization that seeks to combat corruption and promote integrity, transparency and accountability in the Palestinian society. The Coalition was first formed by an initiative from a number of civil society organizations working in the field of democracy, human rights and good governance. In 2006, the Coalition was accredited as a national chapter for Transparency International.**

**AMAN is a Palestinian think tank and a specialized body providing knowledge on corruption at the local and regional level through producing specialized reports and studies. The periodic publications include: The annual Integrity and Anti-Corruption Report, the annual Palestinian Integrity Index and the National Integrity System studies and reports, in addition to the Coalition's continued contributions to produce reports and studies on the status of corruption in the Arab region.**

**As part of the global anti-corruption movement - and of international alliances and partnerships with relevant specialized coalitions and organizations - AMAN plays a key role in the transfer and contextualization of necessary international knowledge and tools to combat corruption in all sectors.**

**Website: [www.aman-palestine.org](http://www.aman-palestine.org)**

**Email : [info@aman-palestine.org](mailto:info@aman-palestine.org)**

**f   @   t   v   in /AmanCoalition**

**Ramallah, Irsal St, Remawi Building , 1st floor**

**Tel : 2989506 2( 970+) 2974949 2 (970+)**

**Fax : 2974948 2 (970)**

**Gaza-Southern Rimal - Habboush St. - Sub of Martyrs St. Dream**

**Tel : 082884767**

**Fax : 082884766**