



Fact sheet on:

**"Scenarios for post-war governance in the Gaza Strip and
their risks to the integrity of governance"**

March 2024



© All rights reserved to the Coalition for Accountability and Integrity (AMAN).

In case of citation, please refer to the publication as follows: Coalition for Accountability and Integrity (AMAN). 2024. Scenarios for post-war governance in the Gaza Strip and their risks to the integrity of governance. Ramallah, Palestine.

The Coalition for Accountability and Integrity (AMAN) has due diligently verified the information contained in this paper, and assumes no responsibility for the use of the information for purposes other than the paper's objectives after its publication.

Introduction:

Since the events of October 7th, 2023, Israel has continued its genocide war on the Gaza Strip. It has destroyed all the resources and landmarks of life in this limited geographic area with the highest population density in the world. The number of martyrs reached about 33,000 while the wounded reached more than 75,000 not to mention the unknown number of missing persons. Furthermore, the attacks destroyed over 75% of the residential buildings and public facilities, including hospitals, universities, schools, and government headquarters. The infrastructure, including streets, water networks, electricity, communications, etc., has also endured severe damage. This ferocious attack aims to make the Gaza Strip unfit for any form of survival and life.

In light of the scenes of violence and mass destruction that mobilized international public opinion, and in light of the unclear Israeli occupation's plans regarding the nature of the government it seeks to establish in the Gaza Strip on the day after the end of the war, many Western, regional and Israeli political and security circles, through some published documents and statements issued by their officials, have put forward several scenarios regarding the nature of the administration of post-war government in the Gaza Strip, in terms of the nature of each scenario, its objectives, its implementation requirements and obstacles that may impede its application in practice. The common thread among these scenarios is the desire of these parties to end Hamas's authority in the Gaza Strip. This is in addition to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's position that the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) should not return to rule in the Gaza Strip as an

important mechanism for preventing the establishment of a Palestinian state.

Despite the grave political, economic, and social risks of these scenarios for the Palestinian cause and the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and the establishment of their independent state, which cannot be ignored or neutralized in any way, this paper aims to present a general conceptualization of these scenarios and identify the risks they entail in terms of their reflection on the integrity of governance and the provisions of the Palestinian Basic Law. It should be noted that the scenarios included in this paper are by way of example, not limitation, and in light of the documents circulated and the statements expressed in the media, but the circumstances on the ground and the outcome of the war may reveal other scenarios that have not been addressed in this paper.

This paper was prepared in three parts: the first part highlights the scenarios presented for post-war governance arrangements in the Gaza Strip. The second part deals with the risks of the scenarios presented on the integrity of governance and the provisions of the Palestinian Basic Law. The third part includes conclusions and recommendations and a list of references used for research purposes. In preparing the paper, the researcher followed a descriptive and analytical approach by collecting information from various sources and analyzing it from the perspective of the risks of the scenarios presented on the integrity of governance and the provisions of the Palestinian Basic Law, without ignoring the direct impact of these scenarios on the future of the national cause and the project of establishing an

independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip with Jerusalem as its capital.

I. Scenarios for governing the Gaza Strip in the aftermath of the war:

The scenarios presented for the administration of the Gaza Strip on the day after the end of the war are as follows:

First Scenario: Occupy and stay in the Gaza Strip after displacing the Palestinians:

According to this scenario, the Israeli war policy for the Gaza Strip is based on a strategy of reoccupation of the Strip after displacing its population outside the Territory. This is evidenced by the scorched earth policy adopted by the Israeli army and destruction of all elements of life, as well as the suffocating siege of the Gaza Strip and forcing the majority of its population to flee to Rafah area as a first step towards displacing them to the Sinai Peninsula.

This scenario was referred to in a document attributed to the Israeli Ministry of Intelligence, which contained three options for the day after the war on Gaza: The population of Gaza remaining under the rule of the Palestinian Authority, the population of Gaza remaining under the rule of an Arab authority, or the population of Gaza being evacuated to the Sinai. The memo recommended the option of forcibly transferring Gazans to the Egyptian Sinai. In its position paper, the Misgav Institute for National Security urged the Israeli government to take advantage of the rare opportunity to evacuate the Gaza Strip, resettle the Palestinians in Egypt and establish a buffer zone on the border with Egypt to ensure that they do

not return to the Gaza Strip¹. This scenario is consistent with the Israeli plan to erase the Palestinian national project and end the existence of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA²). It is also in line with the rhetoric of the Israeli right-wing, which considers the Gaza Strip as part of the "Land of Israel," enabling them to rebuild settlements there, similar to the administration of governance in Areas B and C in the West Bank³. However, this scenario is difficult to achieve and would not be acceptable to the international community in general and to neighboring countries in particular – such as Egypt and Jordan – due to the fact that it is ethnic cleansing, liquidation of the Palestinian cause at the expense of neighboring countries and a threat to Egyptian national security⁴. Another scenario is the reoccupation of the entire Gaza Strip by Israel without displacing the Palestinians, and the establishment of a civil administration under the supervision of an Israeli military administration similar to the one that existed before 1994, and this scenario would impose a heavy cost on Israel for providing services as the occupying power. However, such a scenario is also unlikely, especially since the international community is opposed to a full Israeli reoccupation of the Gaza Strip⁵.

1. Okasha, Kaled, The Western Perception of the Day After on the Gaza Strip, a paper published by the Egyptian Institute for Strategic Studies, dated 7/11/2023.

2. Asfour Hassan, Gaza Settlement Conference and the Judaization Displacement War, Amad Media, January, 29th, 2024

3. Mustafa, Muhannad The Day After in the Gaza Strip: Possible scenarios after the Israeli ground war, a paper issued by the Emirates Policy Center, dated 10/31/2023, and published on <https://epc.ae/ar/details/scenario/alyawm-altali-fi-qitae-gaza>.

4. Major General Mahmoud al-Natour, Scenarios for the Future of the Gaza Strip, a paper issued by al-Natour Center for Research and Studies, dated 2/29/2024, and published on the website: <https://natourcenters.com/>

5. Harb, Jihad, After the Israeli War on the Gaza Strip Six possible scenarios for governance in the Gaza Strip, paper published on 3/11/2023 at <https://www.amad.com.ps/ar/post/521596>

Second Scenario: Arab or international external administration of the Gaza Strip:

According to this scenario, after the end of the war on the Gaza Strip, the US administration will call for an international conference to form an international committee for the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip. The Committee will determine the cost of reconstruction and the share of each country and the entity that will undertake the reconstruction. Additionally, the Israeli army will continue to remain in the Strip for six months until an Arab or international law enforcement force is formed to impose order and control until the management of matters is handed over to the Palestinian side⁶. This scenario faces many challenges, the most important of which is that many countries will be reluctant to join this international administration that does not have sufficient tools to provide an administrative solution to governance in Gaza, and it will be difficult for many countries to agree to send military forces to participate in this process⁷. This scenario also does not provide an answer to the nature of the transitional period, how the situation of the displaced will be addressed, who will provide various services to citizens, and what are the powers of the multinational force and its source. This scenario will be rejected by the Arab countries because its goal is to remove Gaza from the equation of the Palestinian–Israeli conflict in favor of Israel. It will lead to the political disengagement of the Palestinian people in the two parts of the homeland, and the Arab countries will not be willing to participate in managing civil life in Gaza under occupation⁸.

6. Ephraim Ganor, article titled: Towards an international committee that will set the new rules of the game in the Gaza Strip, Maariv, 11/22/2023.

7 . Ephraim Ganor, *ibid*.

8. Tzvi Bar'el, article titled: Netanyahu refuses to recognize that only the Palestinian Authority can manage Gaza, Haaretz, 11/13/2023.

Furthermore, this scenario is not accepted by the Palestinian factions and large sectors of the Palestinian people⁹, as well as the PNA, as stated in a statement by the Palestinian government not to accept a foreign presence, whatever its nationality, on the land of Gaza, imposing a new reality whatever the forms, intentions and motives¹⁰.

Another version of the same scenario put forward by some Americans and Israelis is to place the Gaza Strip under international trusteeship with the United Nations as the main supervisor of peacekeeping forces in the Strip. But this scenario is currently unlikely because international enthusiasm for peacekeeping missions has decreased significantly in recent years. Moreover, even if an international agreement could be reached in this regard, Israel would still insist on its security measures and buffer zones, which would impede the work of international peacekeeping forces¹¹.

Third scenario: Establishment of a Palestinian civil administration subordinate to Israel

According to this scenario, which stems from a plan developed by the Israeli army and approved by the Israeli government, the Gaza Strip will remain under Israeli control, and the army will assume responsibility for the civilian and humanitarian aspects of the Strip. The activities of the UNRWA will be controlled by the army under the pretext of preventing Hamas from controlling the aid, then it will be handed over to a Palestinian civil administration composed of some local figures, businessmen and tribal leaders, and will be affiliated with Israel, similar to the village associations

9. Jihad Harb, Op. cit.

¹⁰ Statement of the Palestinian Cabinet's session on 3/18/2024, published on the Cabinet's website palestinecabinet.gov.ps.

¹¹, Reham Odeh, Four Scenarios for the Day After in Gaza, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: <https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/91560> .

that existed in the early 1980s or the Lahad Army that was established in southern Lebanon¹².

This scenario is problematic since Israel's occupation of the Gaza Strip will force it to deal with the life affairs of the residents of the Gaza Strip, which Israel does not have a plan for. Furthermore, according to this scenario, it will need the cooperation of Palestinian figures to manage civil affairs in the Gaza Strip under the control of the occupation forces, which is unlikely to happen, especially after the statement issued by the Palestinian tribes in the Gaza Strip on 3/24/2024, in which they announced their rejection of Netanyahu's plan that aims to form a civil administration from Palestinian figures in Gaza that is subordinate to the occupation as part of the "day after the war on Gaza" plan, which is known as "the aftermath of the war on Gaza". This scenario also requires finding an international or Arab source of funding that relieves Israel of the economic burden of managing the Gaza Strip, especially in light of the Israeli decision to stop the work of UNRWA, which seems impossible in light of the opposition of most countries of the world and international organizations¹³.

Fourth Scenario: The Palestinian National Authority assumes control of the Gaza Strip without a national consensus

This scenario requires the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) to take over governance in the Gaza Strip as it was before the Palestinian split. It is supported by the US administration and some Arab countries. It requires

.12 Ron Ben-Yishai, The Big Plan to Change the Situation in Gaza, article published in Yediot Ahronot, 10/23/2023.

13. Tzvi Bra'el, Palestinian administration of Gaza hits Netanyahu's strategy in the face, Haaretz, 10/1/2024

the international community to cooperate with the PNA to enable it to take over, by providing the necessary financial support for reconstruction and pressuring the Israeli side to release the Palestinian funds it holds. Among the advantages of this scenario would be the opening of prospects for the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip and an end to the division of PNA institutions¹⁴.

However, this scenario faces many dilemmas, the first of which is on the Israeli side, especially under the current government, which categorically rejects the establishment of a Palestinian state, and considers the Gaza war to be the historic opportunity to end the Palestinian cause and the two-state solution¹⁵. This scenario also faces rejection from the Palestinian Authority, whose officials have stated more than once that they will not accept the return to the Gaza Strip while the Israeli occupation remains, unless it is within the framework of a political process that leads to the establishment of a Palestinian state on the borders of June 4, 1967 and within a specific timeframe. In this scenario, the PA would be seen as a beneficiary of the war and as having taken over the reins of government at the expense of the lives of the victims. This scenario will also be strongly opposed by the Palestinian factions in the Gaza Strip, which will not accept their exclusion from the political scene after the heavy price they paid following the events of October 7, 2023.

Fifth scenario: A return to square one – the situation before October 7, 2023 – with the West Bank administered by the Palestinian Authority and the Gaza Strip remaining under Hamas rule.

¹⁴Jehad Harb, op. cit., p. 5

¹⁵ Hani al-Masri, Towards the crystallization of a national democratic alternative, paper published on the website of al-Natour Center for Studies and Research, on 11/21/2023.

This scenario requires that the war on Gaza end with the degradation of Hamas' military capabilities without ending its rule¹⁶, that Israel and Hamas do not achieve their respective goals from the war¹⁷, and that Hamas returns to rule the Gaza Strip as it did before October 7, 2023. This scenario would reinforce the Palestinian political, geographical and administrative division between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip by reconstituting a government in the West Bank with a limited mandate, while Hamas would return to rule the Gaza Strip once the war is over. Although this scenario is possible depending on current developments on the ground, Israel will not accept being under the constant threat of Hamas and a repeat of what happened in Operation Al-Aqsa Flood. Hamas will not be able to rule the Gaza Strip on its own for external reasons, most notably the regional and international realities that will stand against such a scenario¹⁸, as well as for internal reasons, as Hamas cannot address all the consequences of the war, including reconstruction, on its own.

Sixth scenario: Forming an emergency and rescue government by national consensus:

This scenario assumes a national agreement between Fatah and Hamas to form an emergency and national salvation government of national competencies with Arab and international support, working according to an emergency program, managing the transitional phase in the West Bank and Gaza Strip after the war, establishing the basis for integrating Hamas into the Palestinian political system by joining the Palestine Liberation

.16 Mohannad Mustapha, the Day after the end of the war in Gaza, Op. cit.,

.17 Hani al-Masri, The War on Gaza Scenarios and Consequences, a paper published on the website of the Palestinian Center for Policy Research and Strategic Studies, www.masarat.ps, on 10/17/2023.

.18 . Jamil Hilal, On the Requirements of the Post-Israeli War on Gaza, Policy Paper, Institute for Palestine Studies, November 2023, p. 6.

Organization, and creating the conditions for holding general presidential and legislative elections within specific timeframes. This scenario has the advantage of beginning to end the Palestinian division and opening the way for the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip. However, its realization will face strong opposition from the Israeli side in light of the composition of the current Israeli government, which categorically rejects the establishment of a contiguous Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The realization of this scenario also depends on the maturity of the political will of the Palestinian parties, especially Fatah and Hamas, to restore national unity and end the division in a real way on the ground¹⁹.

II: Risks of the proposed scenarios to the integrity of governance and the provisions of the Palestinian Basic Law

Before reviewing the risks of the above scenarios to the integrity of governance and the provisions of the Basic Law, it is necessary to define two key terms:

1. **Governance integrity:** Governance integrity or political integrity refers to the commitment of those responsible for managing public institutions and public utilities to make their decisions for the purpose of achieving the public interest in compliance with checks, balances, constitutional rules, and democracy. Public integrity is based on a set of principles: Free access to power, equal opportunities to occupy public positions, especially senior ones, transparent management of governance and resources, citizen participation in policy formulation, avoiding conflicts

¹⁹Jehad Harb, Op. Cit., p. 6

of interest, the independence of official oversight institutions (administrative judiciary and the Financial and Administrative Control Bureau), especially in their oversight of the executive authority, in addition to a wide space for the establishment of civil society organizations and media outlets and their freedom to exercise their role in accountability and community oversight²⁰.

2. **Political corruption:** Corruption resulting from the environment provided by the single political system that allows senior officials to shirk official duties related to serving the public interest in the public service, exploiting this power granted to manage public affairs and public money to achieve private interests or to enjoy impunity²¹.

3. **Provisions of the Basic Law:** This refers to those provisions contained in the amended Basic Law of 2003, including the preamble of the Basic Law, the Declaration of Independence issued by the National Council in 1988, as the first constitutional document on which the provisions of the Basic Law were based, and because it defined the identity and nature of the Palestinian state and its commitment to international principles, in addition to being considered an integral part of the constitutional system in Palestine, and the highest of them, followed by the Palestinian Basic Law²²
23.

It is clear from the presentation and analysis of the previous scenarios that the degree to which these risks reflect on the integrity of governance and the provisions of the Basic Law varies. Some of them carry similar and very

²⁰ Aman Coalition, Handbook for Promoting Integrity and Combating Corruption "Concepts and Terminology", 4th edition, 2023. Pg 36.

²¹ Ibid. Pg 37

²² 1. Palestinian Supreme Constitutional Court, Interpretative Decision No. 5/2017, session of 12/13/2018, published in the Official Gazette No. 141. Pg 89.

22. المحكمة الدستورية العليا الفلسطينية، قرار تفسيري رقم 2017/5، جلسة 2018/3/12، المنشور في الجريدة الرسمية عدد 141، ص 89.

serious risks, while others carry relative risks of varying degrees, while the third part of them carries almost negligible risks to the integrity of governance and the provisions of the Basic Law.

The risks of these scenarios are summarized below:

- a. The risks of the first, second and third scenarios to the integrity of the judgment and the provisions of the Basic Law (occupying the Gaza Strip and remaining there after the displacement of the Palestinians, external Arab or international administration of the Gaza Strip, establishment of a Palestinian civil administration subordinate to Israel).**

The risks of the above scenarios to the integrity of governance are:

1. The first scenario, especially as it relates to the reoccupation of the Gaza Strip and the forced displacement of the Palestinian people from their lands – whether directly through the use of force, or indirectly through means of pressure, intimidation, and persecution to push people into displacement – falls within the crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide that fall within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court as stipulated in Articles 6, 7, and 8 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) of 1998. It also blatantly conflicts with all international covenants, conventions and norms related to human rights and international humanitarian law, as well as with all democratic values and principles on which civilized societies are based, as advocated by Western countries that claim to defend political, economic and social human rights, and claim to defend the

values of democracy, the right of peoples to self-determination and their right to choose the form and systems of government that they administer.

2. The installation of foreign rulers or regimes over the Palestinian people without taking into account the will of the Palestinian people to choose who will govern them is a form of political corruption and the absence of the will of the Palestinian people, who have the primary interest and the first and final say in deciding their fate and deciding who will govern them and the form of government they desire, based on the fact that the people alone are the source of authority, and thus the absence of democratic mechanisms to reach power. In addition, this contradicts the democratic principles and values advocated by the free world, and expresses double standards and double standards in dealing with different peoples of the world.
3. The administration proposed by these scenarios will work to implement the agenda of the parties that installed it to serve the interests of foreign parties and the Israeli occupation, and not to serve the general interest of the Palestinian people and achieve their aspirations. The administration will also work to control policies and decisions related to governance and direct them to serve their colonial interests (proxy colonization) and not to serve the interests of citizens, and this authority will be a non-transparent and non-participatory military authority, which is a conflict of interests and the perpetuation of political corruption.

4. The proposed scenarios speak of installing a governing authority for the Palestinian people with almost absolute powers and authorities without being subject to any form of Palestinian popular and institutional oversight, and reconstruction projects, if implemented, will be without oversight, and thus the environment will be suitable for acts of corruption, which makes that authority politically corrupt and cooperative, and even subservient to the occupation, which in turn will work to provide the appropriate environment for committing corruption in all its forms and forms, and thus the absolute authority will become an absolute corrupter.
5. The governing authority proposed by these scenarios constitutes a tool for plundering public resources and natural wealth that should be directed and managed for the benefit of the Palestinian people, and using these resources and wealth for the benefit of the occupation and its collaborators, which in turn constitutes one of the pillars on which political corruption is based.
6. The ruling authority proposed by these scenarios will not allow civil society organizations and media outlets to freely and effectively exercise their role in community accountability and oversight, but rather will be stifled and prosecuted to the point of closing them down as long as they play roles that conflict with the ruling authority's agendas and policies.

On the other hand, **the previous scenarios clearly contradict the provisions of the Palestinian Basic Law**, as they ignore the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, and ignore the nature of the

system of government in Palestine defined in the Basic Law as a representative democratic system that relies on political and party pluralism and through direct elections, and wastes rights. Basic and public freedoms for citizens guaranteed under the Basic Law, and disrupting the right of Palestinians to participate in political life by forming political parties, joining them, forming unions and associations, voting and running in elections, and aborting the values of democracy and the freedom of individuals and groups to determine their fate through free and direct general presidential and legislative elections. It undermines the work of the three constitutional institutions, legislative, executive, and judicial, strips them of the powers assigned to them by law, disrupts the work of oversight, accountability, and accounting bodies and anti-corruption bodies in managing public affairs, ignores the requirements of integrity, transparency, and accountability in everything related to Palestinian public affairs, and absent the work of law enforcement agencies. Therefore, it disrupts the principle of the rule of law, leads to the absence of justice, the spread of crime, and the spread of chaos in its various forms, and undermines the requirements of governance in managing, disposing of, and monitoring public money and natural resources.

Risks of the fourth and fifth scenarios on the integrity of governance and the provisions of the Basic Law (Return of the PNA to rule the Gaza Strip without a national consensus, or return to square one before the events of October 7th, 2023)

The risks of the previous scenarios on the integrity of governance are as follows:

1. The difficulty of holding free and fair elections at the presidential, legislative, and local levels, as a result of political instability, and because of the state of conflict that will arise between the resistance movements in the Gaza Strip and the Palestinian Authority, or because Hamas will not allow them to be held in the Gaza Strip (in the case of the fifth scenario), thus keeping the executive and legislative powers in the hands of the executive authority, and the absence of the principle of separation between the three powers, with the consequence that absolute power becomes absolute corruption.
2. The continued exclusivity of the ruling authority in appointing the occupants of senior positions and the lack of clarity of the criteria on which it relies in the appointment process, in the absence of a regulatory body that ensures the transparency and integrity of appointments to senior positions.
3. Undermining the independence of the judiciary as a result of the executive authority's interference in its work, whether by controlling the appointment process to senior leadership positions in the judiciary, or by interfering in the implementation of judicial rulings and sometimes impeding their implementation, and influencing the decisions of courts, especially the Supreme Constitutional Court, to serve the interests of parties and individuals in the executive authority.
4. The fragility of the work of oversight institutions as a result of the absence of the main body of oversight represented by the Legislative Council, and the executive authority's unilateral appointment of the heads of some of them in the absence of the

role of the Legislative Council in approving the appointment process, and thus the role of these bodies in the oversight process remains nominal and limited and is not exercised over the entire Palestinian territory, and may even reach the point of disrupting their work – especially in the Gaza Strip – under pretexts and justifications related to the excessive powers that will be granted to law enforcement agencies to enforce public order and the law.

5. The absence of oversight over the management of public funds and natural resources, as a result of the paralysis of the Legislative Council, which has the constitutional mandate to approve the general budget, monitor its implementation, and approve the granting of concession contracts related to the management of public utilities and the exploitation of natural resources.

As for the impact of the previous scenarios on **the provisions of the Basic Law**, it would make it very difficult for constitutional institutions to exercise the powers entrusted to them by the constitution and the law. They also contradict the establishment of a representative democratic system based on political and party pluralism, and affect the right of citizens to exercise the public freedoms and rights guaranteed in the Basic Law by limiting their exercise to opponents of the ruling regime in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. They also (in the case of the fifth scenario) perpetuate the Palestinian political, geographical, and administrative division, and impedes the right of the Palestinian people to establish their free and independent state on the entire national territory in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Jerusalem, thus leading to alignment with Israel's policy of not allowing the

establishment of a unified Palestinian state in both the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Jerusalem, in addition to undermining the social fabric, social values, justice in bearing burdens and distributing aid, reconstruction efforts, and deepening the human tragedy, especially in Gaza after the destruction caused by the Israeli war waged on the Gaza Strip.

B. Risks of the sixth scenario on the integrity of governance and the provisions of the Basic Law (forming a national emergency and rescue government by national consensus):

This scenario contributes to unifying the Palestinian people and ending the political, geographical and administrative division. It allows the Palestinian people to determine their self-determination and establish a Palestinian state, strengthens the authority of the Palestinian people as the source of the authorities to exercise their right to determine the form of government appropriate for them, and contributes to the establishment of a democratic system based on political and party pluralism through free and direct general elections for presidential, legislative and local elections, enables constitutional institutions to exercise the powers assigned to them in the constitution and law, and enhances the work of monitoring, accountability, anti-corruption and law enforcement agencies in all matters related to the administration of the affairs. However, the success of this scenario depends on the success of regional, Arab and international pressure to enter into a peace process to implement the two-state solution, with the participation of a comprehensive regional approach to end the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and secure sufficient funding for the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip.

Findings:

The key findings of the paper are:

1. The first three scenarios constitute the perpetuation of foreign colonization and/or the continuation of the Israeli occupation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, both of which undermine the integrity of governance and constitute clear images of political corruption, as foreign regimes are installed over the Palestinian people without their will and even against their will, and the regimes take their decisions away from the interests of the Palestinian people, are not subject to any form of oversight, and exploit their power and influence to serve their own agenda. These regimes exploit their power and influence to serve their own agenda, the emergence of groups supported by the occupation (zalam, mukhtars, agents, brokers, and war mongers), and the exploitation of public resources and even looting them for their own benefit, away from the interests of the Palestinian people, all this is political corruption in its clearest form, as foreign colonization and the continued Israeli occupation, on the one hand, and political corruption, on the other hand, are two sides of the same coin.
2. The first three scenarios blatantly contradict the provisions of the Palestinian Basic Law. They deny the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, ignore the nature of the system of government in Palestine, which is defined in the Basic Law as a representative democratic system based on political and party pluralism, violate the basic rights and public freedoms of citizens, and undermine democratic values related to holding free and

direct presidential, legislative, and local elections. It also undermines the work of the three constitutional institutions (legislative, executive, and judicial), strips them of their powers, disrupts the work of oversight, accountability, and anti-corruption bodies in managing public affairs, ignores the requirements of integrity, transparency, and accountability in all matters related to public affairs, and undermines the requirements of governance in the management, disposal, and control of public funds and natural resources.

3. The fourth and fifth scenarios carry with them negative risks to the integrity of governance, as it will be very difficult to hold free and fair elections at the presidential, legislative, and local levels, thus the absence of the principle of separation of powers, in addition to the continued unilateral appointment of high-ranking positions by the ruling authority in the absence of a watchdog to ensure the transparency and integrity of appointments in those positions, in addition to compromising the independence of the judicial authority by controlling the appointment of those in charge of it and influencing their decisions in favor of the ruling party, in addition to the fragility of the work of oversight institutions as a result of the absence of the main body of oversight represented by the legislative council In addition to the fragility of the work of oversight institutions due to the absence of the main oversight body represented by the Legislative Council and the ruling authority's control over other oversight institutions if they exist, which keeps their role in oversight and accountability formal and limited, not to

mention the absence of oversight and accountability over the management of public funds and natural resources.

4. The fourth and fifth scenarios clearly contradict the provisions of the Basic Law, as it will be very difficult for constitutional institutions to exercise the powers entrusted to them. They also contradict the establishment of a representative democratic system based on political and party pluralism, and lead to compromising the right of citizens to exercise the public freedoms and rights guaranteed in the Basic Law by restricting their exercise to opponents of the ruling regime, in addition to consolidating the Palestinian political, geographical and administrative division (in the case of the fifth scenario) and impeding the right of the Palestinian people to establish a free and independent state on all national territory
5. The sixth scenario is considered the best for the Palestinian cause and the Palestinian people's right to self-determination, as this scenario unifies the Palestinian people and ends the political, geographical and administrative division, enshrines the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, gives them the right to decide who will govern them and the form of government they want, contributes to the establishment of a representative democratic system based on political and party pluralism through free and direct general presidential, legislative and local elections, enables constitutional institutions to exercise the powers assigned to them in the constitution and law, and enhances the work of oversight and accountability bodies to combat corruption.

Recommendations:

To avoid the negative effect of the first proposed five scenarios on the integrity of governance and the provisions of the Basic Law, the following recommendations are made:

1. Urgent action and intensified efforts by the Palestinian leadership and factions, both at the international external level and at the internal level, to confront all scenarios that seek to liquidate the Palestinian cause and deprive the Palestinian people of their right to self-determination, to live in freedom and dignity, and to establish their independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital on all Palestinian land.
2. Call for a serious national dialogue in which all Palestinian factions participate in order to end the political, administrative and geographical division between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
3. Rebuilding the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) on democratic and representative bases, and developing a national political program agreed upon by all factions to manage the Palestinian cause, end the Israeli occupation, and establish an independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital.
4. Agreeing on the formation of a Palestinian technocrat government, away from partisan quotas, to manage the transitional phase according to an emergency program to rebuild the Gaza Strip in the first place, address all the effects of the war, and make the necessary arrangements to hold presidential, legislative and local elections within specific timeframes.
5. Agreeing on a national reform program that includes all political, administrative, financial, economic and social aspects, and

implementing this program in specific stages and within specific timelines.

References:

1. Major General Mahmoud Al-Natour, Scenarios for the Future of the Gaza Strip, a paper issued by Al-Natour Center for Research and Studies, dated 2/29/2024.
2. Ephraim Ganor, article titled: Towards an international committee that will arrange the new rules of the game in the Gaza Strip, Maariv newspaper, 11/22/2023.
3. Aman Coalition, Handbook for Promoting Integrity and Combating Corruption "Concepts and Terminology", 4th edition, 2023.
4. Jamil Hilal, On the Requirements of the Post-Israeli War on Gaza, Policy Paper, Institute for Palestine Studies, November 2023.
5. Jihad Harb, After the Israeli War on Gaza Six possible scenarios for managing governance in the Gaza Strip, a paper published on the Amad Media website on November 3, 2023.
6. Hani Al-Masri, Towards the crystallization of a national democratic alternative, a paper published on the website of Al-Natour Center for Studies and Research, on 11/21/2023.
7. Hani al-Masri, The War on Gaza ... Scenarios and repercussions, paper published on the website of the Palestinian Center for Policy Research and Strategic Studies, on 10/17/2023.
8. Hassan Asfour, The Gaza Settlement Conference and the Judaization War of Displacement, a paper published on the website of Amad Media, on 1/29/2024.
9. Muhannad Mustafa, The Next Day in the Gaza Strip: Possible scenarios after the Israeli ground war, a paper issued by the Emirates Policy Center, on 10/31/2023.

10. Rham Odeh, Four scenarios for the next day in Gaza, paper published on the website of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, on 6/2/2024.
11. Ron Ben-Yishai, The Big Plan to Change the Situation in Gaza, article published in Yediot, on 10/23/2023.
12. Tzvi Berel, article titled: Netanyahu refuses to recognize that only the Palestinian Authority can manage Gaza, Haaretz, 11/13/2023.
13. Tzvi Berel, article titled: Palestinian administration of Gaza hits Netanyahu's strategy, Haaretz, 10/1/2024.
14. Khaled Okasha, Western perception of the day after the Gaza Strip, paper published by the Egyptian Institute for Strategic Studies, 7/11/2023.
15. Statement of the Palestinian Cabinet session on 3/18/2024, published on the website of the Council of Ministers.
16. Palestinian Supreme Constitutional Court, Interpretative Decision No. 5/2017, session of 12/13/2018, published in the Official Gazette No. 141.