

The Impact of Appointing Members and Heads of Local Government Units on Political Integrity

Working Paper Presented to AMAN's Annual Conference 2022

Introduction:

State powers are divided between central government and local governments that take decisions to manage and regulate citizens' daily needs to include urban planning and organization, granting building permits and certifications for professional practices, as examples. In addition, these governments are responsible for securing citizens' access to services such as water and electricity, cleaning and paving the streets, sanitation and market regulation as well as ratify permits for professional practices.


Therefore, if central governments derive their legitimacy through a vote of confidence granted to them by representatives elected by the citizens (legislative councils/parliaments), it is only natural that the same rule applies to local governments. This indicates that elections are the best means which allow citizens to participate in choosing individuals they deem most capable to run and manage their affairs.

For this reason, Law No. 10 of 2005 made local elections the only means to assume an administrative position of a local government unit (LGU). In this regard, five elections were held in the State of Palestine since 2004 with the Gaza Strip (GS) participating only once, which was the first local elections held in 2004 and 2005. During these elections only the first, second and fourth phases were conducted in the GS out of a total of four. The third phase, which included major LGUs such as the cities of Gaza and Khan Younis elections were not held.

After the internal division and take-over of Hamas in the GS in 2007, applying the democratic method in forming local councils in the GS's 25 municipalities became very complex. Hence, a decision was issued on July 16, 2007 to dismiss the Gaza, Bureij and Rafah councils and to appoint three others in their place¹.

No periodic local elections (every four years in accordance with the law) have been held in the GS since then, which deprived the GS citizens from electing their representatives and weakened their social role in holding local council members accountable. This does not mean, however, that the local councils, regardless of the legality of the method by which they assumed their positions, are dismissed from supervision and accountability. Control is necessary in terms of adhering to the values of integrity and the principles of transparency in work procedures as well as being subject to accountability under all circumstances. And as the Prophet Mohamad said: "Each of you is a shepherd and each is responsible for his flock."

¹ Statement by the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights titled "PCHR Rejects Municipal Appointments in the Gaza Strip", posted on the following link: <https://pchrgaza.org/>.



AMAN focuses on the mechanism and outcome of the PA's decisions. Its assessment is based on governance integrity in terms of the legitimacy of access to power, transparency of procedures and the extent by which it is subject to accountability, as basic criteria to ensure that best practices are followed in favor of the public interest and in combating corruption. This paper aims to shed light on the mechanisms of access to power/membership in LGUs (i.e., the legal basis at work on the one hand, and the extent of applying integrity and transparency in the processes of selecting members, on the other hand).

The commitment of local councils, whether elected or appointed, to the provisions of the law and to the principles of political integrity, means that public interest was top priority in their decisions. In other words, public interest is to be the only criterion and top motivating incentive in making decisions without consideration to interest of certain individuals or personal gains.

Failure to adopt a general policy for holding elections for local councils in LGUs has led to the dominance of a specific political ideology within these institutions. It also weakened the governance integrity at the local level, provided fertile grounds for opportunists to obtain personal gain, even if it was partisan, at the expense of public interest (i.e., political corruption).

All of this raises the question as to what extent the appointment policy of the local authorities in the GS has affected political integrity (Governance integrity)? The answer to this question is provided through a set of indicators, which are as follows:

- Indicators on equal opportunities for access to local council membership (risks of failure to hold elections in LGUs).
- Indicators on preventing conflict of interest in the performance of the councils' members.
- Indicators concerning the values of integrity, transparency and participation in the decision-making process of local councils.
- Indicators of corruption (political corruption) resulting from the appointment process of councils' members.

First: Case description

The Gaza Strip forms the Southwestern part of Palestine and extends over an area of 360 km² with a population of 2.17 million². It is divided into 25 municipalities. No elections were held in the GS since the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA) except for one local election that was held in 2004-2005. The council of ministers divided the election process into four stages three of which were conducted, the first, second and fourth³. In the meantime, the third stage was postponed, which included four big cities: the Gaza municipality, where elections were held twice, in 1924 and 1946⁴; the Khan-Younis municipality where elections were held only once in 1946⁵, in addition to the cities of Nuseirat and Jabalia where no elections were ever held in the past.

Moreover, no elections have been held in the GS after Hamas took control on June 13, 2007. Hamas exercised its control in this regard by dismissing several of the existing local councils and applied the appointment policy rather than elections in the administration of the LGUs. The appointments

2 Central Bureau of Statistics <https://pcbs.gov.ps/postar.aspx?lang=ar&ItemID=4280>.

3 The Central Elections Commission website: <http://www.elections.ps/tabid/603/language/ar-PS/Default.aspx>

4 Gaza Municipality website: <https://www.mogaza.org/mog-history>.

5 Interview with Mr. Alaa' Addeen Al-Battah, Head of the Khan-Younis Municipality, on Sept. 27, 2022.

aimed at serving purely partisan orientations without taking public interest into consideration. This may be because the ruling body needed people who are compatible with it and implement its vision, and not people who work against the tide⁶ and therefore work to ruin it.

Second: Legal framework for selecting Local Government Units councils

Law No. 10 of 2005 specified that elections are the only way in which members of local councils can assume the management of LGUs. However, this has been stalled in the GS since 2005. As we sought opinions of specialists, concerned parties from political parties, and heads and members of local councils, we found that there is a discrepancy of the reasons that led to the failure of holding local elections.

Third: Appointment as an alternative to elections

There is consensus that the method of appointment for local councils is unacceptable and unfavorable⁷. In general, all heads of councils surveyed were against the principle of appointment and expressed their full readiness to step down from office in order to hold elections⁸.

The Authority in the GS offered the political factions a participatory deal in the management of LGUs by asking them to nominate names to be appointed within the local councils. However, this offer was refused by the factions, which led to the formation of councils from one political ideology⁹. The Authority in the GS interprets the refusal of other parties' participation in nominating appointees as fear of bearing responsibility and hence the consequences of failure in the management of citizens' affairs¹⁰. The factions, however, justify the issue differently as they called for local elections, in accordance with the law, especially since some believe that any participation in the management of the local authority without elections, as happened in the WB, contributes to reinforcing the division and may bring it to the point of separation¹¹. Those who refused participation... see that taking part in the management of LGUs through appointments is legalizing that method as an alternative to elections¹². They also believe that the quota method represents a sham existence since the majority will be for those in power and hence any other presence in the Council will not have a real impact¹³.

The continuation of appointments in the management of LGUs throughout the period of the internal division strengthened Hamas' monopoly in most important positions, such as the presidency and or member of the councils in LGUs that included loyalists to the movement, which left an impact in many areas including:

1. Absence of the principle of popular participation through elections that determine the nature and diversity of municipal councils, which weakened the legitimacy and funding of the councils at the local and international levels. It also reduced the possibility of hiring technical staff and using modern tools and means at work. All of which was reflected in the quality of public services and policy development, and led to the failure of the capabilities of municipal councils and their sovereignty from political interference. It also resulted in the weakness of LGUs in providing sound policies and

6 Interview with Mr. Imad Adwan, Head of Beit Hanoun Municipality, on Sept.22, 2022.

7 Interview with Mr. Hatem Al-Ghamri, Head of Al-Maghazi Municipality, on Sept.20, 2022.

8 Interview with Mr. Yahya Sarraj, Head of the Gaza Municipality, on October 3, 2022. Also, interview with Mr. Hatem Al-Ghamri, previous source.

9 AMAN, 2020, Integrity, Transparency and Accountability in LGUs: Local Integrity System in Beit Lahia Municipality, Gaza, Palestine. P.3

10 Interview with Mr. Kamal Ab-Oun, Secretary General of Hamas' Political Office, on Sept.28, 2022.

11 Interview with Mr. Walid Al-Awad, member of the Political Office of the People's Party, on October 6, 2022.

12 Interview with Mr. Osama Al-Haj Ahmad, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) Leader, on October 5, 2022.

13 The previous source.

regulations that allow for the development of the private sector, infrastructure and services in the GS¹⁴. In addition, since it was appointed and not elected, the council head and members avoided facing the central authority and lived in constant sense of fear, unlike members of the elected councils. Therefore, participation of other factions and blocs in the management of LGUs is a necessary condition in order to avoid a single party or ideology that governs, manages and supervises the work of LGUs. As is, board meetings look like a one-vote political party's committee meetings¹⁵. And at times, they find it unnecessary to discuss all of the proposed issues seriously due to the dominance of the political party and its loyalists' common view, with little margin of freedom in other areas.

2. Appointment Mechanism: the ruling party in the GS applied two methods to form its local councils. The first method is direct appointment by the ruling authority in Gaza. While the second method is by "selection" based on the community elites' meeting recommendations.

- **Direct appointment**

Direct appointments are carried out by assigning Hamas committees, from the various areas of the Strip, to propose names which they see as qualified for membership of the local council in their areas¹⁶. The names are then submitted to a committee consisting of members from the Movement and the Ministry of Local Government¹⁷ (MoLG) to determine the candidates for membership of the Council in accordance with a set of criteria adopted by the Committee beforehand.

As for those nominated for the presidency of an LGU council, their names are submitted and recommended by committee from members of the Hamas movement. And although candidates must be interviewed before a final decision is made, this has not been carried out. Moreover, expertise and specialization are often not respected in many cases as some individuals were selected whose specializations and experience were not related to the management of local affairs and others who were qualified were excluded¹⁸.

It is worthy noting appointment of an LGU council, after passing the selection stages, is finalized by a decision of the (MoLG) under the name of a temporary committee that is granted the powers to run the municipality for a renewable period of one year¹⁹. And while some of those appointed see that the MoLG plays an active role in the selection and appointment process²⁰, others, mainly former appointees, say that the Ministry plays no role in the process... its role is a mere formality that is limited to issuing the appointment decision²¹.

14 Interview with Mr. Abedrabu Al-Anzi, Professor of Political Science at Al Azhar University, on October 7, 2022.

15 Interview with Mr. Mohammad Abu-Ghneim, a former LGU Deputy- Head, on Sept.24, 2022.

16 Interview with Dr. Kamal Abu-Oun, previous source.

17 The previous source.

18 Interview with Mr. Mohammad Abu-Shikyan, a former municipality head, on September 24, 2022.

19 Interview with Mr. Iyad Al-Maghari, previous resource.

20 Previous source.

21 Mohammad Abu-Shikyan, previous source. Mohammad Abu-Ghneim, previous source.

• Selection through the recommendations of the community elites (Gaza Municipality)

The Gaza LGU practiced a different method of appointment from the usual traditional direct method used by the ruling power. The proposed president/chairman called for popular support for the selection process, since access to elections is elusive²². The process was engineered by the ruling authority in the GS by inviting a number of community elites to a meeting called the Open House²³. The invitees included heads and members of neighborhood committees; representatives of the various unions and federations; Mukhtars^{**}; men of reform; individuals from the private sector and civil society organizations (CSO). During the meeting, the main idea was presented and Dr. Yahya Sarraj was recommended for the presidency of the Gaza municipality. In addition, several other names were proposed, 30 to be exact, some of whom were among the attendees and others were not. The attendees also suggested the formation of a selection committee, of which the new president was among the members. The selection was carried out by the committee, where the current president of the Council said that: "when selecting the rest of the members, the diversity of disciplines, geographical distribution, women and Christian representation were considered"²⁴.

Although the appointed president received approval and praise for his integrity by many, the method was considered an unacceptable charade by some. The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PLFP) for example, considered the re-forming of the Strips LGUs and local councils by selectively appointing their presidents does not contribute to the development and progress of these bodies. It also denies individuals with professional competencies the chance to find solutions to problems and issues²⁵. Moreover, other citizens find what occurred was a matter of formality only and that the President and the Council were known to all prior to that meeting²⁶. Other criticisms and debates were regarding the selection criteria applied by the Committee where some said that they were ambiguous and lack transparency, while others said that there are specific and clear standards applied for this purpose²⁷. In the meantime, there were those who claimed that they had no knowledge of any criteria.

3. Appointments and equal opportunity: in order to realize equality, one needs to commit to the principle of equal opportunity, which is one of the constitutional and humanitarian pillars. This principle assumes equal access for people in the same legal positions to reach what they desire whether to public office or parliamentary or local representation, or even in private businesses. In other words, it means that there should be no discrimination between individuals based on partisan orientations, ethnic or religion, etc.

The appointment policy applied by the ruling authorities as an alternative to elections is a blatant dismissal of the principle of equal opportunity. And in particular, because these authorities usually appoint individuals that would represent their position and maintain their image in the Council. While elections would produce divergent opinions as there are different views in society²⁸.

22 Interview with Dr. Kamal Abu-Oun, previous source, interview with Dr. Yahya Sarraj, previous source.

** (This title is given to a respected older man who played the role of the town mayor in the past. The word literally means the chosen one)

23 An article entitled "The Gaza Municipality: Sudden Appointment in the Name of Elections...Far from Abiding by the Law", Al-Hadaf Magazine, July 28, 2019.

24 Interview with Dr. Yahya Sarraj, previous source.

25 Al-Hadaf Electronic Magazine, previous source.

26 A non-elected new president of the Gaza Municipality, AMAD News Agency <https://www.amad.ps/ar/post/308077>

27 Interview with Dr. Kamal Abu-Oun, previous source.

28 Interview with Dr. Abed-Rabu Al-Alanzi, previous source.

And even though those in charge of appointments in the GS believe that there is an opportunity for every person that sees him/herself competent to be nominated for appointment by approaching a committee member in the various areas and expressing his/her desire for a membership in the Council²⁹, others see that this approach is difficult to fathom and that the decision to change some local councils was not announced in a transparent way for all to see. This made it difficult for those who desired to nominate themselves to do so, and if they found out by chance, it was also difficult to know how and where to seek nomination and hence they were denied the chance due to these difficulties.

In conclusion, it is safe to say that the principle of equal opportunity cannot be achieved by implementing the appointment policy. This is because the partisan criterion (i.e., party affiliation and loyalty) is the first and foremost criterion in the formation of these councils, and all other considerations and criteria are secondary, especially when it comes to appointing a candidate on the basis of the need for harmony within the Council that can realize the ruling authority's vision³⁰.

4. Appointments and conflict of interest³¹

Conflict of interest is a situation where a person derives personal benefit from actions or decisions made in their official capacity. In addition, conflict of interest is considered an entry point to corruption and hence must be avoided at work and prevented in the appointment process.

We asked a number of CSO and political parties' representatives if they felt or knew if conflict of interest cases exists in the said selection mechanism? Interestingly, the same disagreements emerged over election and appointment even if the main issue was on conflict of interest. There were those who said that the absence of a direct interest for the person proposed for appointment is one of the initial conditions by which acceptance or exclusion is made, and if a person has certain interests with the municipality that were not known at the time of appointment, he/she would later be disqualified³². Some presidents of LGUs stated that they do not know if a criterion on conflict of interest is included or not in the appointment selection, noting that none of the members of the Council had a direct interest in the municipality other than the ordinary interests that any citizen needs from the municipality, such as water or permits³³. As for the Gaza Council and the method used for selection, that is a different case, as avoiding conflict of interest was not among the selection criteria. However, members of the Council during their first meeting agreed, without a written decision, that anyone who finds himself in a conflict of interest should relinquish his/her own interest³⁴.

On the same issue, there are those who believe that the idea of conflict of interest is not even proposed in the appointment process, neither before or after appointing heads and members of LGUs councils. Examples include: a lawyer was appointed who was assigned by persons in conflict with the municipality. And there is a case of a land dealer³⁵ who was working with the municipality... although a person who was familiar with the case who testified that this merchant did not buy any land in the vicinity of the municipality during the period he was officially associated with the municipality³⁶.

29 Interview with Dr. Kamal Abu-Oun, previous source.

30 Interview with Dr. Kamal Abu-Oun, previous source.

31 It should be noted that there is no stated public policy in the GS to address conflicts of interest.

32 Interview with Dr. Kamal Abu-Oun, previous source.

33 Interview with Mr. Alaa' Addeen Al-Battah, previous source.

34 Interview with Yahya Sarraj, previous source.

35 Interview with Mohammad Abu-Shkian, previous source. Mohammad Abu-Ghneim, previous source.

36 Interview with Mr. Alaa' Addeen Al-Battah, previous source.

5. Relationship between the designated local councils and the Competent Ministry (Ministry of Local Government in the Gaza Strip)

In reality, due to the weakness and the lack of resources of the LGUs in the GS, the recommendation method was strengthened as a result of implementing the appointment process instead of elections, which led to the encroachment of the Local Government Ministry in the work of the LGUs.

And in defense of the independence of the Local Council after being appointed, supporters of the process point out that the law is invoked when a conflict arises between the Council and any other party. They also state that once the appointment process is completed, the political party's role becomes limited to follow-up and evaluation³⁷. However, there are those who believe that this applies to normal circumstances and regular everyday work of the LGUs. As for major disputes whether with the Ministry or within the Council, the final reference is the political movement (Hamas). An example of this is the dispute which occurred between the president and members of the Nuseirat Municipal Council where Hamas, to settle the issue dismissed all opposing members of the Council and kept the President of the Council with a new formation³⁸.

There is a contrary view to the above saying that the ruling authority did not interfere in this matter, and it was the President who dismissed the members while the MoLG only approved his decision³⁹. However, we are not aware of any provision that grants the President of a local council the right to dismiss council members.

6. The idea of public interest as a criterion for governance integrity:

The idea of integrity of governance is based on the principle that public interest and no other must be the guide to decisions and actions of those in charge of managing public affairs.

It is true that an elected person or an appointee may deviate from this criterion, but that deviation is linked to the individual or even the group regardless of the reasons that brought on this characteristic. Nevertheless, those elected to representative positions remain bound by law and are held accountable by the public. While the idea of appointment to representative positions may by nature have the tendency to deviate from the public interest due to two reasons:

- The first is that the person appointed to work will not earn the public's satisfaction as much as he would earn the satisfaction of the party that appointed him. In other words, he will try to please that entity rather than the public, since it has his fate in its hand.


- The second reason is that the appointees are usually members of the same party because the appointing body/committee generally chooses party representatives more than popular ones. Consequently, these representatives will have to respond to partisan directives rather than popular interests. In this regard, the ideological party mind is always known for its partisan and political commitment at the expense of public orientations and public opinion⁴⁰.

37 Interview with Dr. Imad Oun, previous source.

38 Mohammad Abu-Ghneim, previous source.

39 Interview with Dr. Kamal Abu-Oun, previous source.

40 Interview with Dr. Abedrabu Al-Anzi, previous source.



This calls for balance between the public interest and narrow interests, whether partisan or that which serves influential people in the ruling party. Moreover, there is no doubt that elections provide greater ability to counter interference by the central political authority or other political parties' affiliates. That's because the elect derived his/her legitimacy from the electoral base that granted him/her their vote. The appointed person, on the other hand, derives his legitimacy from that party whose interest or vision may conflict with public interest⁴¹.

This is acknowledged by many including the appointed presidents themselves. However, some say that this is not a general rule but rather depends on the personality of the official with focus on the president as he is the one with the highest authority. He is also the one who would be confronted, based on the idea of a just ruler as an alternative to institutionalizing governance which would ensure integrity and close corruption gaps in general, and or corruption of influential officials in the political arena in particular.

⁴¹ Interview with Mr. Walid Al-Awad; Mr. Osama Al-Haj Ahmad, previous sources. Interview with Mr. Is-haq Mkheimer, Elections Commissioner in Fatah's High Leadership Committee in the GS, on October 4, 2022.

Conclusions and Recommendations

First: conclusions

- If it is possible to occupy positions or head public institutions of the State under transparent and specific conditions and criteria based on equal opportunity and merit and away from any considerations or interest of any political party, then representative citizen positions and centers must also not be appointed but accessed through general elections such as: parliaments, LGUs, charity and CSO organizations, unions and federations, clubs etc. according to the integrity and transparency standards. This guarantees citizen's right to participation and accountability. It also helps to reduce acts of political corruption practiced by some who may benefit from the environment provided by the ruling political party that controls decision-making centers of the legislative, executive and judicial authorities, hence providing an opportunity for impunity for perpetrators of political corruption.
- The process for selecting heads and members of local councils through appointments and not through elections is not a democratic way to gain power. It has been engineered to serve and strengthen the control of the ruling authority and its loyalists over the LGUs authorities, which weakens the integrity of governance and provides an opportunity for some manifestations of political corruption.
- Many appointees, political parties' representatives and intellectuals consider it essential to adopt local elections as a mechanism for occupying local councils' positions (presidency and members).
- It is unjustifiable to link the non-holding of local elections to the presidential and legislative elections with all its political dimensions. However, this does not cancel the demand for holding all elections.
- The secrecy surrounding the changing/replacing of local councils is the basis for the cancelation of the principle of equal opportunity in nomination, which may lead to losing competencies that could lift and push forward the LGUs. More importantly, it steals the right of citizens to choose their representatives in the Council.
- The GS ruling authority's exclusivity in determining and selecting the names of candidates for appointments prior to assigning them has weakened the independence of LGUs councils and the extent to which they represent citizens. It also led to their submission to partisan orientations and practices of the local government.
- The results of forming LGUs with no political diversity or otherwise led to the complete exclusivity in decision-making relating to those councils to include dismissal, appointment, alteration and making decisions that may often be questioned by others.

Second: Recommendations

- Put an end to the political division as well as to its repercussions, political, economic and social disadvantages, and work towards creating an environment that is immune to corruption.
- Hold general elections "legislative and presidential" immediately to allow for broad participation of citizens and to restore balance in the political system. This is feasible by applying the principle of the separation of powers, in accordance with the provisions of the Palestinian Basic Law.
- Hold local elections as soon as possible and allow citizens to express their opinion freely by choosing those who manage their daily lives hence responding to this urgent need.
- The need to deal with local elections independently from the general elections (i.e., away from any considerations or interest of any political party), in order for local elections to become a sign of hope and not part of the problem.

References

- 1- Statement issued by the Palestinian Center for Human Rights entitled "PCHR rejects municipal appointments in the Gaza Strip". <https://pchrgaza.org/> .
- 2- Hamas Press release (fragmented elections reinforce exclusivity and exclusion) Al-Risaleh Newspaper; on March 13, 2022.
- 3- Central Bureau of Statistics: <https://pcbs.gov.ps/postar.aspx?lang=ar&ItemID=4280>
- 4- Interview with Mohammad Abu-Ghneim, former LGU Deputy- Head, on Sept.24, 2022.
- 5- A non-elected new president of the Gaza Municipality, AMAD News Agency, March 4, 2022. <https://www.amad.ps/ar/post/308077>.
- 6- Omar Sha'ban, completion of local elections in the Gaza Strip is the way out to end the impasse, Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, August 2022.
- 7- An article entitled "The Gaza Municipality: Sudden Appointment in the Name of Elections...Far from Abiding by the Law", Al-Hadaf Magazine, July 28, 2019.
- 8- Gaza Municipality's website: <https://www.mogaza.org/mog-history>
- 9- The Central Elections Commission website: <http://www.elections.ps/tabid/603/language/ar-PS/Default.aspx>
- 10- Integrity, Transparency and Accountability in LGUs: Local Integrity System in Beit Lahia Municipality, Gaza, Palestine. AMAN, 2020.

Interviews

- 1- Interview with Mr. Imad Adwan, Head of Beit Hanoun Municipality, on Sept.22, 2022.
- 2- Interview with Mr. Osama Al-Haj Ahmad, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) Leader, on October 5, 2022.
- 3- Interview with Mr. Is-haq Mkheimer, Elections Commissioner in Fatah's High Leadership Committee in the GS, on October 4, 2022.
- 4- Interview with Mr. Hatem Al-Ghamri, Head of Al-Maghazi Municipality, on Sept.20, 2022.
- 5- Interview with Mr. Abedrabu Al-Anzi, Professor of Political Science at Al Azhar University, on October 7, 2022.
- 6- Interview with Mr. Kamal Ab-Oun, Secretary General of Hamas' Political Office, on Sept.28, 2022.
- 7- Interview with Mr. Yahya Sarraj, Head of the Gaza Municipality, on October 3, 2022. Ra'ed
- 8- Interview with Mr. Ra'ed AS-Samouni, Director of Public Relations and Media at the Central Elections Commission, on October 5, 2022.
- 9- Interview with Mr. Iyad Al-Maghari, Head of the Al-Nssairat Municipality on Sept. 25, 2022.
- 10- Interview with Mr. Alaa' Addeen Al-Battah, Head of the Khan-Younis Municipality, on Sept. 27, 2022.
- 11- Interview with Mr. Walid Al-Awad, member of the Political Office of the People's Party, on October 6, 2022.

AMAN
Transparency Palestine



AMAN was established in 2000 as a civil society organization that seeks to combat corruption and promote integrity, transparency and accountability in the Palestinian society. The Coalition was first formed by an initiative from a number of civil society organizations working in the field of democracy, human rights and good governance. In 2006, the Coalition was accredited as a national chapter for Transparency International.

AMAN is a Palestinian think tank and a specialized body providing knowledge on corruption at the local and regional level through producing specialized reports and studies. The periodic publications include: The annual Integrity and Anti-Corruption Report, the annual Palestinian Integrity Index and the National Integrity System studies and reports, in addition to the Coalition's continued contributions to produce reports and studies on the status of corruption in the Arab region.

As part of the global anti-corruption movement - and of international alliances and partnerships with relevant specialized coalitions and organizations - AMAN plays a key role in the transfer and contextualization of necessary international knowledge and tools to combat corruption in all sectors.

Website: www.aman-palestine.org

Email : info@aman-palestine.org

AmanCoalition

Ramallah, Irsal St, Remawi Building , 1st floor

Tel : 2989506 2 (970+) 2974949 2 (970+)

Fax : 2974948 2 (970)

Gaza-Southern Rimal - Habboush St. - Sub of Martyrs St. Dream

Tel : 082884767

Fax : 082884766

AMAN'S core program is funded by the Government of Norway, Netherlands, and Luxembourg